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NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE

BY THE EDITOR

Poor human nature has suffered sorely at the hands of both enemies and friends. It has been the synonym for weakness and defeat, the explanation for every sin, the excuse for all types of shortcomings. If one wishes to justify a course of selfishness or social antipathy, he has only to appeal to human nature and there is enough of moral flabbiness about most of us to give in good-naturedly that nothing better was of course to be expected. Though we make it the mother of crime, we worship it. If one of our fellows perchance takes a serious view of it and feels he must flee it as he would the wrath to come, endeavoring to stifle it in the interest of a higher morality, we anathematize him and exhort him to keep at least a little of his humanity. These characters are more rarely with us than of yore, but we feel an uneasiness, not to say a certain wearisomeness in the presence of a piety, a dignity, or an intellectual self-assurance that seems devoid of the common touch which makes kinsmen of us all. What strange insight, or lack of it, is it that leads us to seek that which we deplore or to exalt that which at times we mention so disparagingly. What is the occasion of this contradiction of ideas, this welter of inconsistency, when once we touch upon the question of human nature. May it not arise from two things, the first being the nature of the subject itself, and the second the failure to attain clearness of thought regarding the meaning of selfhood or personality.

Obviously our thought of human nature must spring from our own experience of selfhood in which we are chiefly conscious of moral conflict. Over against the impulse to goodness we find continually the suggestion to baseness. In the midst of our noblest endeavors we are conscious of a down-

ward pull. The accomplishment of any task calls for the overcoming of inertia. We are made for education, but we cannot have it without toil. We are made for moral achievement, but there is always a price exacted. Even in following the line of high desires there seems in the background a devil of *laissez-faire* urging us to desist. One might conceivably like to do nothing better than to write editorials. It is an ideal that perchance has led one to forego poverty, insult and criticism. It is the thing one wants to do. Not to have it to do would be tedious. Yet when the time comes to write, the fiend says "wait till tomorrow; next week you will have a greater inspiration." Most people who do creative work put in hours fighting "the fiend." In the struggle of personality, moral achievement is no exception, and the more conscientious one becomes the more he struggles with the fiend. No wonder Luther threw the ink bottle at the devil. Who has not often longed to do that same thing himself? What wonder then that with such a conflict uppermost, the average individual is in doubt which is human nature, one's angel with his perfectly smug, pious and decorous appearance, or the fiend so alluring, so full of promises, so tempting.

We have advanced only so far in our consideration as to have made our second point clear. The situation in which we find ourselves demands clear thinking as to the meaning of selfhood and the relation it bears to its surroundings. What is nature and what is human nature, and what is their relationship to each other? Before we come to the positive formulation of our ideas, however, it may be wise to view two common and contrasting opinions which have long held the stage of attention.

I.

THE EXPONENTS OF TOTAL DEPRAVITY.

Foremost in the consideration of human nature must be counted the exponents of total depravity. They have obvi-

ously lost heart fighting the fiend. Their only answer is that the fiend must be destroyed, totally and eternally rooted out. They are thoroughgoing and do not intend he shall have one little cubby-hole in which he shall hide. So long as he is around they feel there is no safety. And they are not at all backward in identifying human nature with the fiend. They are conscious of his mocking laughter, his laziness, his spirit of compromise, his insinuating of himself into the presence of the smiling, smug angel of the sprouting wings. He takes the polish off the gold of self-satisfied worth and just manages to hold us back from complete satisfaction. To such there is no explanation of this conflict save the one of total depravity. Whence came the fiend? They can only account for him by pointing at poor old Adam. The fiend is the result of original sin. As the old Webster's Spelling Book has it: "In Adam's fall, we sinned all." There is little of surprise that such considerations led to the assumption of depravity, inasmuch as the fiend seemed to take life so easily and to be so greatly at home with us, while the angel seemed forever to be having such a sorry time. The conclusion was easily reached that nature was bad. Human nature thus came to be looked upon as a department of nature, and nature was something over against God trying to wreck his holy purposes and bring to naught all that was good. So in one way or another sprang that dualism which worked the complete separation of nature from the supernatural and trained itself as best it could to despise, detest, renounce and forever abhor all that was natural. By the same token it attempted to love, honor and obey everything it could think of which was above and beyond nature. The only difficulty the race has had with this regimen was that where it was most completely worked out, it came most startlingly near to being a pose. Like the pictures of fifty years ago, in which the hand was thrust into the opening of the vest, the head thrown back and clasped in a vise, the eyes staring, the surrounding scenery obvi-

ously unnatural, there is a feeling that the natural might not be so bad after all. One wishes that the subject might step out of the photograph and smile or even show his teeth to indicate that he was the possessor of thought and emotion.

II.

ENNOBLING HUMAN NATURE BY FIAT.

One of the strangest things about this question is that human nature has been equally betrayed by its friends. The anti-puritans and the naturalists we have always with us, and if the exponents of total depravity have failed in the understanding of human nature, much more have they failed who have exalted human nature as a part of nature. If it is fatal to fight down all natural impulses as bad, it is equally fatal to pronounce them all by nature good. This latter mood is the temper and also the calamity of our times. John Dewey has recently written on *Human Nature and Conduct* in an attempt to show up the fallacies of the exponents of depravity, total or original, and ends by making it appear that human nature *is* depraved as not possessing within itself the power to do more than serve as the automatic register of impulses over which it has no control. It is the victim of habit with no power of choice. Thus at a stroke he seems to remove from human nature the moral element, because morality can live only where there is choice, moral responsibility, and with it the foundation of organized society, must there-upon cease logically to exist. Human nature is discovered as lapsing back into nature, and all that which gave it dignity and power is seen to be nothing more noble than animal habits, or the functioning of plant and cell. The only thing we have left is the assertion of Doctor Dewey, in spite of all the evidence of our common sense and logic that human nature, though lacking in moral quality, is the noblest thing on earth. That is to say, the real God of a moral character, founded on freedom, is taken from us and in its place is issued the fiat money of specious assumption. Not only so, but

this fiat currency is not cleverly printed and shows obvious haste and an anxiety to flood the market by depreciating all previous issues. One need have no sympathy at all with the opponents of total depravity to be quite conscious of the weakness and untenability of such a position. If human nature is incapable of moral worth it is obviously useless to talk about its nobility. We cannot talk sanely about the nobility of the pig in the sty. Yet we do not blame him for eating with his feet in the trough. We say it is his nature and we properly assume that in his dreams he is not worried by conscious reflection on the moral turpitude of his greed. We say of him that he is a fat pig or that he is good for roasting, but we do not call him noble except by debasement of language. Evidently calling him a noble pig does not make him such. Human nature which obviously lacks the power of moral decision can surely take no credit to itself and cannot be ennobled by fiat.

III.

WHAT IS HUMAN NATURE?

What then is human nature? It is a curious fact that with so much discussion of human nature there has gone so extraordinarily little understanding of it. If the present attempt goes the way of a multitude of others, it will at least not be lacking in abundant company.

Is human nature to be in any way distinguished from nature? It seems to the writer that our present scientific tendencies have all been in the way of overlooking certain fundamental facts. From youth we have heard of the desirability of discovering "the missing link" and within a week of the writing of this article that phrase formed the scare-head of a leading metropolitan daily. Why all this excitement over proving the likeness of the modern physical man with that of the anthropoid apes? Simply because the real distinction between man and the animals is overlooked. The real

distinction is not physical but spiritual. The highest animal we know, and he should by the theory of evolution be much higher than any of his buried ancestors, is a world-remove from man, not by skull measurements but by his lack of the power of conscious reflection. If he had this, no matter how hairy he might be, or low of forehead, he would have speech, language, social institutions, law and religion. If this be true then, it may very well be that human nature is one step higher in the scale than just animal nature and our problem nearer solution than we thought. Human nature possessing the power of moral reflection in realizing itself must obviously be true to its highest moral possibilities. To be less than that is to be unnatural. The living cell that refuses to function loses its nature of living cell. The plant which refuses to respond to its environment and possibilities as a plant sustaining leaf and flower and fruit perishes or drops back to the inorganic. May there not be in human nature that call to self-realization which makes righteousness, truth, beauty and love its natural habitat and functioning. This functioning is none the less natural because it results from struggle. The selective power which the cell has more than the inorganic is not perhaps easily realized. Soil and rain, when the cell ceases to select, rot and destroy just as surely as they build up and make alive so long as the cell continues to function. We must then take human nature for what it possesses of possibility and not for what it possesses without effort. Human nature is separated from biological nature by the possession of higher powers, just as biological nature is separated from inorganic nature in a similar way. Each is natural in its own sphere only as it realizes its true highest possibility.

IV.

THE RELATION OF NATURE TO THE SUPERNATURAL

It will be clearly seen that in the controversy that has been

waged over human nature the term super-natural has been abused. It cannot mean what it is most frequently taken to mean, *the anti-natural*. To the inorganic realm the organic would be super-natural, to the organic the world of conscious reflection must hold a sense of supernaturalism and if there is a still further order of life which is self-conscious and self-directive and yet not bound by temporal and spatial limitations this would to a time-and-space existence be supernatural. There is no conflict nor antipathy between these ascending orders. Each is natural within its own sphere. One can hardly see how the ardent protagonist of evolution can do less than to assume a struggle toward greater perfection and powers by which comes the ascending order of life. Why should it be assumed that only powers that are effortless and choiceless are akin to nature, while *effort* is a mark of the unnatural. If there be any truth in evolution at all, it would seem to lie in the line not of mere possibility but of struggle toward highest self-realization.

When the theologian has spoken disparagingly of the "natural" man he has meant man at his lowest, man unwilling to make the effort demanded for completest self-realization, but the term used, while representing a fact, has been misleading and unfortunate. This is especially true since those who so use this term suppose the whole world of nature to be the work of a super-natural divinity. In which case they have often put themselves in the predicament of commending God and condemning his works. If this world of temporal and spatial relations, of organic and inorganic life is but that system of relations and realities which is upheld by the Supreme Creative Intelligence it appears that the chief distinction between natural and supernatural is a distinction of character and possibility only and not of nature. There remains then no reason why the old antipathy should still confuse us. Human nature most fully realizes its nature the nearer it approaches the divine. It may be that the destructive character of sin lies chiefly in its transgression of true nature, its unnaturalness.

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE: PERSONALIST

By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

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If anyone imagines that philosophy consumes conviction or depletes moral vigor, let him consider well the character of its foremost American representatives. There is hardly a closet man among them, although each of them stayed in his closet long enough to find out what he wanted to do and to say. Whatever may be said as to their originality, their independence remains unchallenged.

I.

Not the least vigorous among American philosophers—possessed indeed of an exceptional fund of virility—was Borden Parker Bowne. Professor Eucken in an earnest tribute to him in Boston in 1914 said of his writings:

“They are pervaded by an energy and manliness which show no fear, either of criticism on the part of the half-enlightened, or of the dictum of those assuming to be in authority.”¹

Well might Professor Bowne be free from fear from those in authority, for his was no superficial acquaintance with philosophy.² After graduating from the University of New York in 1871, he studied philosophy for two years—from 1873 to 1875—at the Universities of Halle, Paris and Göttingen and thereafter had that best of grounding in any subject, the task of teaching it. For thirty-four years (1876-1910) he was professor of philosophy and dean of the Graduate School of Boston University, where he was greatly admired and beloved by his students. During all this long service he was unwearied in the intelligent propagation of what he well termed a life

¹R. T. Flewelling: *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy*. P. 18.

²Borden Parker Bowne was born in Leonardville, N. J., Jan. 14. 1847, and died in Boston, April 1, 1910.

philosophy, a philosophy of life and for life. He had a firm faith in the mission of philosophy to everyday living. To his students, his audiences and his readers, in a time of great intellectual uncertainty and confusion he brought what was hardly less to many of them than a saving philosophical faith.

Professor Bowne's chief indebtedness philosophically was to Kant and Lotze. But of neither could he be said to be a disciple. There was an independence and self-reliance in his thinking which placed him among those who breast the waves alone, conscious of the strength of well-formed convictions. He began, as did so many other vigorous thinkers of his day, by tilting his spear at Herbert Spencer, publishing his first volume, *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, in 1874,³ and thereafter he proceeded to formulate a philosophy of his own, devoting his attention successively to theism (*Studies in Theism*, 1879); to metaphysics (*Metaphysics*, 1882); to psychology (*Introduction to Psychological Theory*, 1887); to ethics (*The Principles of Ethics*, 1892); and to logic (*Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 1897). In his later years he wrote much on religion and theology and their relations to philosophy, srowning his work with his *Personalism*, 1908 and *Studies in Christianity*, 1909.

There is a fine courage as well as comprehensiveness in Professor Bowne's ordered and systematic body of thought, revealing breadth without superficiality and at many points displaying the contributive quality of a fresh, acute and well organized mind. If at times there is suggestion of dogmatism in his utterances, it is never that of the *ex cathedra* type,¹ but always that of the eager and convinced truth lover. If space and time, "those two great intimidating phantoms," as he termed them, had no terrors for him, if he uttered himself at times with great positiveness, as one very sure of God, if he dismissed certain points of view as the idle wind which he

³Written in his Senior year in the University and published in *The New Englander*. The article attracted the attention of Noah Porter and led to a warm friendship between the writer and himself.

respected not, it was not because he had not thought and thought thoroughly, but rather because he had reached conclusions, not only upon individual problems but upon the prior problem of philosophy itself, which gave him a convinced basis for all his yeas and nays.

In endeavoring to appraise his legacy to American thought we will occupy ourselves first with his conception of the nature and function of philosophy and then with his chief contributions to philosophic and religious thought.

II.

Professor Bowne's conception of the immediate function of philosophy is, as related to life, positive, clear-cut, and surprising, almost, in its simplicity. It may be termed the theory of philosophy as *the interpretation of experience*. It is an appeal for the recognition of the *whole man*, as concerned with the truth that he needs for the best and fullest life.

A striking statement of this conception of philosophy is found in the introductory chapter of his *Theism* (1902), supplemented and enlarged by the first and last chapters of *Personalism* 1907. The discussion of theism opens with a sharp and well directed criticism of intellectualism, especially in the form of logic, which he terms the "method of rigor and vigor" and which he regards as a wholly inadequate and barren method of attaining truth:

If there were any beings who had nothing to do but to syllogize and for whom belief had no practical bearing, they might safely adopt the method. . . . But man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract spectator. He is also a living being with practical interests and necessities to which he must adjust himself in order to live at all. It has been one of the perennial shortcomings of intellectualism that man has been considered solely as an intellect or understanding; whereas he is a great deal more. Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration and these are far more powerful factors than the logical intellect.⁴

⁴pp 17, 18.

There is nothing new about this. It has been said a thousand times; but it is no every day occurrence to have it said by a trained philosopher who formulates it in a defensible and constructive way and makes it the prolegomenon of a positive and well proportioned philosophic theory, a theory which negates only in order to affirm:

All hope of deduction and logical demonstration, then, must be given up; all that thought, scientific or religious, can hope to do is to interpret experience. It seeks to explain or clarify or systematize the matter given in experience. . . . Thus we see that all our thinking rests on a teleological foundation. The mind is not driven by any compulsion of objective facts, but rather by the subjective necessity of self-realization and self-preservation.⁵

This simplification of philosophy may seem to be its abrogation, but such is not the intention of its proponent. He excludes no established or essential function of philosophy. Having asserted that "whatever our total nature calls for may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof" he then proceeds to assign due place and office to logic, relating it functionally to the practical postulates, its office being "not to prove them but to bring them and their implications out into clear consciousness and to keep them from losing their way. The function is not constitutive but regulative."⁶

There is here then no surrender of intelligence but rather the vindication of it, as that which summons the whole of our nature to the rational discovery and application of truth to life. "Philosophy aims at a rational and systematic comprehension and interpretation of experience."⁷ By means of this conception of philosophy, Professor Bowne is enabled to make an adjustment and harmonization of those three too often conflicting viewpoints—common sense, science and philosophy. In this adjustment the three co-operate. "They are

⁵p. 27.

⁶p. 31.

⁷*Personalism*, p. 44.

not mutually contradictory or indifferent realms but rather mutually supplementary aspects of the mind's effort in the attempt to understand itself and its experience."⁸

In resorting to *experience* as the road to truth and interpretation as its goal, the claim for *demonstration* must be frankly abandoned. This is true of all forms of truth. Science is as far from the ability to demonstrate its assumptions as is philosophy.⁹ It cannot even interpret its own laws:

Science studies the laws of coexistence and sequence among the facts of experience and leaves their interpretation to philosophy. A certain extension of the scientific field, however, must be made in this way. Science may undertake a certain kind of interpretation in its own field of space and time without going into the metaphysical field which belongs to philosophy.¹⁰

III.

The dedication of philosophy to the interests of the whole man has approved itself to many minds as fundamentally sound and pertinent. It constituted as healthy a revolt from a dry scholastic idealism as James' *Pragmatism*. Yet, after all, like Pragmatism, it is too limited a view of philosophy. It leaves truth at the mercy of every wind that blows. Not infrequently Professor Bowne harks back to that wan spectre which the eighteenth century raised and upon which, in spite of its insufficiency, Bishop Butler relied so completely. Probability may perhaps answer in the realm of natural science and even in that of practical affairs but it will not support conviction in the realm of the ultimate and spiritual. It is quite too tenuous, too shifting, too liable to be swept away by some new form of experience or interpretation.

Moreover a philosophy of our undifferentiated total nature is too heavily weighted on the side of the temporal, physical and practical. It does not make enough of the principle of

⁸*Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, p. 3.

⁹Cf. *Theism*, p. 21.

¹⁰*Personalism*, p. 10.

values, upon which Bowne seems to have laid comparatively little emphasis in spite of the place which it holds in Lotze's philosophy. Moreover it is too oblivious of intuition. The validity of intuition is, of course, open to question. Professor Bowne might have challenged it as he did the validity of demonstration, but he simply left it on one side. This ignoring of intuition leaves his restriction of philosophy to *interpretation* without sufficient warrant or rather it leaves the content of experience undifferentiated and hence unappraised. We touch here the limitation not only of the philosophy but of the philosopher. Professor Bowne was too much the practicalist and too little the mystic. He spoke with too slight respect of "the affirmation of a transcendental something above thought and extension as the well worn phrase to which there is no responding thought,"¹¹ although, as he himself admits, the transcendental belongs to the "imagination," for which he claimed the right of recognition.

Unless either philosophy or religion has some well assured source of conviction, some certain and dependable knowledge of what lies at the heart of mystery, however limited that knowledge may be, we are left with a craving for reality unanswered, a life theory insufficiently validated for the needs of life. This does not mean that philosophy as the interpretation of experience is not true and pertinent as far as it goes. Interpretation is the chief business of philosophy but it does not go far enough unless it goes back of experience to that intuitional truth which lies at the root of both religion and philosophy and which enters into experience itself, giving it not only depth but anchorage.

IV.

Professor Bowne's philosophy transcended its earlier limitation when it advanced beyond interpretation to the interpreter and came to a focus upon personality. Experience meant nothing to him except as the experience of a person.

¹¹*Theism*, p. 156

As his thought matured he came to "the insight that we are in a personal world from the start and that the first, last and only duty of philosophy is to interpret this world of personal life and relations." Philosophy for him, that is, took the form of personalism. This is the true goal of a philosophy of experience, although it is not the only possible goal. The interpretation of experience might have led him to pure empiricism, as it has so often done, if he had lost sight of the *experiencer* in the *experience*. But he was of another mind than this. All of his convictions and attitudes and reflections upon life led him to conclude that the *self* is the key to knowledge and to reality.

Personalism defined itself for him, first of all, as a denial of naturalism. By this he meant naturalism not as "a scientific method" but as a "philosophic doctrine."¹² For naturalism as a scientific method he had the utmost respect. Indeed he found no quarrel whatever between philosophy and science and always held strongly that they complement each other. But when science exceeds its sphere and attempts to explain all things in heaven and earth, he pronounced the enterprise unqualified failure. Equally clear to him was the failure of impersonal idealism. Abstractions detached from persons and objects seemed to him the height of learned folly. The impersonal idea is a pure fiction. "All actual ideas are owned, or belong to someone, and mean nothing floating free."¹³

The religious character of Professor Bowne's philosophy is very marked. He "put religion at the very center," as Professor Eucken said of him.¹⁴ His was no half-hearted or conventional religion but as straightforward and genuine and intelligent as the man himself. His belief in God, in revelation, in incarnation, in atonement, and immortality was unquestioning.¹⁵ His faith found expression and justification

¹²*Personalism*, p. 219.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 253.

¹⁴Flewelling: *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy*, p. 20.

¹⁵See his letter to a former student published in *The Personalist*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 14.

in theology which was not only in perfect accord with, but supplemented, his philosophy. He was one of the few American philosophers who moved naturally and without strain, taking his philosophy with him into the sphere of theology proper, where he exercised a most salutary influence.

Professor Bowne's purely theological volumes are as follows: *The Christian Life* (1898), *The Atonement* (1900), *The Immanence of God* (1905) and *Studies in Christianity* (1909). The last of these, *Studies in Christianity*, occupies an unique place in American religious literature. It might well have been entitled *Counsels to the Churches* by a Philosopher and Friend. Wiser counsel could not have been offered. It is in essence a trenchant exposure of the inherently wrong and suicidal consequences of maintaining an obscurantist attitude toward modern thought in the face of the progress which has taken place. In very plain terms, which are as kind as they are plain and with a breadth of outlook which is reassuring, he points out the wider meaning of revelation as over against the narrower; the deeper human significance of incarnation and atonement understood "in the light of human experience;" the mistake of confounding experience and theology; the folly of setting up a single type of experience as alone truly religious;¹⁶ the true nature of the Kingdom of God "in which the great normal forms and interests of life represent the Divine will and purpose;"¹⁷ the duty of the church toward moral progress as being "at the head of all the forces in life that make at once for social permanence and social progress,"¹⁸ and, finally, the need of a deeper sense on the part of the church of "its relation to the truth and of its obligations to it."¹⁹ "The church should always be a church for the ignorant, but it should never be an ignorant church."²⁰

¹⁶p. 238.

¹⁷p. 320.

¹⁸p. 354.

¹⁹p. 399.

²⁰p. 397.

Here is a tract for the times which fulfills Paul's injunction to "speak the truth in love." It is a credit to the great denomination of Christians (Methodist) of which Professor Bowne was a loyal member that it has, to a large degree, taken this message at its real worth and in the spirit in which it was uttered. It is a message not for one Christian body but for the entire American church, coming as it does with peculiar pertinence from a devout Christian philosopher.

VI.

The philosophy of Professor Bowne is the leading expression of that significant movement in modern thought that has come to be termed Personalism.²¹ He was the outstanding Personalist, by virtue of the strength and success with which he stated the foundation principles of philosophic Personalism. Not that he was by any means alone in this task. Harris, Howison, Royce and Palmer set forth the principles of Personalism and, still earlier, Alcott pushed into the realm of personality and found in it the fundamentals of reality and value. Indeed in some respects these thinkers surpassed Bowne in the thoroughness with which they probed and evaluated the self, both in its individual and social nature. Yet Bowne realized more fully than any of these the centrality of selfhood. He saw most clearly, also, the fontal place of the Divine Self in Personalism. His chief emphasis was upon the reality and character of the Infinite Person. He was as convinced and ardent a theist as American philosophy has produced. He saw in theism "the supreme condition of both thought and life."²² Without a theistic faith, he affirmed, "we must stand as dumb and hopeless before the deeper questions of thought and life as a Papuan or a Patagonian before an eclipse."²³

²¹Dr. Bowne wrote, in a letter to his wife, dated May 31, 1909, "I am a Personalist, the first of the class in any thorough-going sense." An Intimate Portrait of Bowne, by K.M.B., *The Personalist*, Vol. II, No. 1, January, 1921.

²²Preface of *Theism*.

²³*Ibid*, p. 43.

Perhaps no writer, certainly no American, has shown greater force and skill in refuting anti-theistic theories and in interpreting the implicates of the Christian conception of God. While he retains the doctrine of creation, it is that of eternal creation rather than creation in time. The ethical attributes of God are for him more important than the meta-physical. He regards it as fruitless to attempt to prove this the best possible of worlds, but finds clear evidence of moral beneficence and wisdom in the world as we know it. He does not enter into the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity but finds much to suggest "community of personal life in the divine unity itself."²⁴

Seldom has theism been presented in so reasonable and forceful a manner. Not that the presentation is wholly free from criticism. His designation of God, as "the World-Ground," while it served a good purpose, in that it avoided the anthropomorphic implications attaching to "Creator" and similar terms, is defective in being in itself too impersonal, in spite of the fact that he entitles one of his chapters "The World-Ground as Personal." His leading conception of God, however, is not so much that of the World-Ground as the One "who insistentlly constitutes himself the rational and absolute spirit."²⁵ In *Personalism* he advances to a still higher recognition of God, terming him supreme goodness and defending this conception with great force and resourcefulness:

"We are no longer content with an absolute being selfishly enjoying himself or with a simply benevolent being who gives gifts to men at no cost to himself. . . . We cannot worship any being who falls below our human ideals of love and goodness."²⁶

Whatever hesitation philosophy may feel in granting all of Professor Bowne's positions, or endorsing all of his emphases, it certainly must concede that he has presented a

²⁴*Ibid*, p. 288.

²⁵*Theism*, p 198.

²⁶*Personalism*, pp. 298-299.

strong case for regarding this world of ours as, above all else, "the personal world."

VII.

Personalism is by no means a perfected, hardly as yet a fully formulated, philosophy. Its professed advocates are thus far few. Indeed there are objections to those who hold this point of view posing as a school, with formulae, defences and shibboleths. Yet there are many, not only in America but in Europe and even in the Orient, who have builded, or are building, a life philosophy, rejuvenating if not new, upon its *principia*. Whatever one's theory of the universe, as Professor Royce has said: "We live by believing in one another's minds as realities."²⁷

After the depression of the greater human values which has accompanied modern science, Personalism reinstates man in his true place in the cosmos, not that regal one which he held in the old anthropocentric universe, but a truer and worthier, because a less detached and more congenital one. For a time it seemed as if man had been swept away by the tides of natural science to the verge of the universe, at the very moment of his conquest of nature bereft of all his spiritual acquirements and kinships. But with a deeper insight into the meaning of evolution and of the nature of selfhood, man as person has come once more to his own. It is fitting to rejoice over his recovery, for he was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found. This does not mean that all of the philosopher-scientists allowed man to sink into insignificance. More than one of the representatives of the evolution philosophy never lost the sense of the priority of the person. At the very hour of the victory of the evolution theory in America John Fiske wrote:

"In the deepest sense it is as true as it was ever held to be, that the world was made for Man, and that the

²⁷*The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 360.

bringing forth in him of those qualities which we call highest and holiest is the final cause of creation."²⁸

Yet though Personalism restores man to his true place in the universe, it does not necessarily leave him unrelated to his world but rather makes him brother as well as lord of all creation, true lord only as he is true brother.²⁹ Man finds in himself the key to his world and only as he reverences and understands himself can he reverence and understand nature. Such reverence and understanding are impossible, however, if he is his own source and end. Personalism does not leave him thus alone and unexplained with no personal source to whom to refer his being and his end. It recognizes Original and Infinite Person, not only as World-Ground but as source and goal of existence.³⁰

VIII.

Personalism is an expanding and far from completed philosophy. It is confronted by issues and problems which will tax the philosophic mind indefinitely. It is possible here to do no more than roughly indicate some of these.

In the first place there is the exceedingly difficult problem of the relation of the self to the body, of thought to brain. This has been raised anew by the new psychology, especially by the extravagances of behaviorism. "Never, surely," as Professor A. O. Lovejoy has said, "did a sillier or more self-stultifying idea enter the human mind than the idea that thinking as such, that is to say, remembering, planning, reasoning, forecasting, is a vast irrelevancy, having no part in the causation of man's behavior or in the shaping of his fortunes, a

²⁸*The Idea of God*, Preface p. xxi.

²⁹A peculiar sense of this kinship and a unique form of personalism—pan-personalism it might be termed—appears in the president's address at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1918, by Professor Mary Whiton Calkins (published in *The Philosophical Review* of March, 1919, under the title "*The Personalistic Conception of Nature.*") It is one thing to find, as we certainly do, the foregleams and incipient elements of personality in the life below that of man and another thing to regard these as in any true sense constituting actual personality.

³⁰"Person in man cannot be, without surplusage of person out of which man is born or evolved." Charles F. Dole: *A Religion for the New Day*. p. 266.

mysterious redundancy in a cosmos which would follow precisely the same course without it."³¹ The thinking person is a fact if anything is a fact. He *is*. But how is he related to his environment, his body, the brain through which he lives and knows and acts? Can psycho-physical parallelism consist with Personalism? If not, if parallelism must yield to some form of interaction, what is the nature of this interaction? And how are the ethical as well as the psychological bearings of this singular intimacy to be understood, and so far as possible, directed?

The social nature and aspects of Personalism also remain as yet but partially uncovered, significant and valuable as has been the progress in the knowledge of the "conjunct self," and of the mutuality and the complementary nature of the individual and society, in contrast with the outworn idea of their inherent hostility. Perhaps no problem, at once philosophical, ethical and psychological, is more fascinating and more fraught with consequences for the future than that which Professor Royce left to his successors: How far, and in what respects, is the community a person? Manifestly the group is not only personal, but in some respects, though not in all, a person. Perhaps it might be termed a personate. How far then does a personate or composite self differ from an individual self in its nature, its capacities and its obligations?

Associated with such problems, though in a sense distinct, are many vital questions connected with the moral and social applications of personalism, to sex, to education, to democracy, to all the relationships of our complex life. The working out of these problems, theoretical and practical, will require much thought as well as investigation.

As the implications and applications of personalism become richer and more fruitful, obligation will deepen to its most intrepid and farsighted advocate, Borden Parker Bowne.

³¹Pragmatism as Interactionism, *The Journal of Philosophy*, No. XVII, No. 23, p. 632.

RESURGAM

JOHN RICHARD MORELAND

It happened on an April day,
 Bounded by skies so blue and still,
 And olive trees all hushed and gray,
 They led One up a skull-shaped hill
 Followed by a crowd whose piercing cry,
 Was, "Crucify!"

It happened on an April morn,
 They nailed a Man upon a tree
 Whose head was circled with sharp thorn,
 Lifted Him high that all might see
 His agony, His heaving breath,
 His awful death.

It happened on an April eve—
 The air was cut by one sharp cry
 That wine nor gall could not relieve:
 "Eli . . . lama . . . Sabachthani" . . .
 Then lightning, thunder crack on crack,
 The sun was black.

It happened on an April day . . .
 They tombed a Man (the crowd had fled)
 Sealed it; and set a watch that way
 To flout His words; to prove Him dead;
 And show Himself He could not save
 From the dark grave.

It happened on an April day . . .
 A tremor shook the paling gloom,
 A white flame tore the door away,
 Life came a victor from the tomb.
 Love cannot die, nor truth betray . . .
 Christ rose upon an April day!

THE SOCIAL GOSPEL AND THEOLOGY

BY ALBERT C. KNUDSON

Boston University

There are four aspects of the social gospel that have a more or less direct bearing on theology. These are its predominant interest in the present earthly life, its democratic tendency, its ethical emphasis, and its stress on social solidarity. We might consider each of these aspects and its theological implications separately, but this would involve not a little repetition, as the different aspects mentioned sustain a close relation to each other. It will therefore be better to take them up together and point out the bearing of the social gospel as a whole on the main topics in theology: the doctrine of God, the doctrine of sin, the doctrine of redemption, and the doctrine of the future life. The discussion of each will necessarily be brief.

In the conception of God the social gospel stresses his democratic character. This is a reaction against the autocratic elements in the older doctrine of God. Under a despotic government it was natural to think of God as an irresponsible despot. He was the source of all authority, and hence might do as he chose with his own creatures. He might predestinate them to everlasting life or condemn them to eternal death. The decision lay wholly in his own hands. But such an idea is manifestly offensive to our modern democratic sense of justice. Bishop McConnell tells a story of a Jacksonian democrat who in a public service protested against the doctrine of the divine decrees, declaring that "the people would not stand for it." In earlier times such a protest would have had little weight. The people then had no rights either as against God or the theologians. But today the conception of popular rights is penetrating theology. Arbitrary action is condemned in God as well as in a human ruler. Some have gone so far as to object to applying the word "king" to the Deity, and have seriously proposed that instead of "the

Kingdom of God" we should speak of "the democracy of God" or "the commonwealth of God." But this impresses one as religious pedantry. Furthermore, kingship expresses an essential idea in the thought of God. God is not elected by the people. He rules in his own right. He is the embodiment of those absolute ideals which we do not make but find, and to which we are in duty bound to submit whether we will or no. Then, too, there are inexplicable elements in the universe, that necessarily to us have the appearance of arbitrariness, and to these also we must bow whether we like it or not. There is therefore in the rule of God a note of sovereignty that transcends the democratic ideal. In a democracy the important thing is that the ruler please the people; in the divine government the important thing is that the people please the ruler.

When we talk about democratizing the idea of God, what we usually have in mind is moralizing it, bringing out the thought of the divine responsibility. As Bowne used to say, God is the most deeply obligated being in the universe. This is implied in the Christian conception of the divine Fatherhood, but it was overlooked by the traditional theories of the atonement. There God was thought of as an autocratic ruler whose honor must not be offended, or as a stern judge whose primary concern was with the strict enforcement of the principle of retributive righteousness, or as a governor whose fundamental interest lay in the efficiency of his administration. In all of these theories there is an important truth, namely this, that there is an ethical ideal which not even God dare sacrifice in order to please men. But this truth was crudely expressed, and the fact was overlooked that the ethical ideal is incomplete without the notion of the good will and the sense of responsibility to others. Justice and mercy are not antithetical terms. In an ancient prophecy we read that Jehovah is "a just God *and* a Saviour" (Is. 45:21). The two ideas go together, and are combined in the thought of the divine Fatherhood. By virtue of his paternal relation

to men God is under obligation to do anything he can to save them. It is this truth that is commonly associated with what is called the democratic idea of God. Rauschenbusch, for instance, says of Jesus that "when he took God by the hand and called him 'our Father,' he democratized the idea of God. He disconnected the idea from the coercive and predatory state, and transferred it to the realm of family life, the chief social embodiment of solidarity and love. He not only saved humanity; he saved God. . . . The value of Christ's idea of the Fatherhood of God is realized only by contrast with the despotic ideas which it opposed and was meant to displace. We have classified theology as Greek and Latin, as Catholic and Protestant. It is time to classify it as despotic and democratic."¹

There is, however, a danger of identifying God too closely with the interests of humanity. The danger lies not only in the direction of a weak and immoral sentimentalism, but also in the direction of an extreme limitation of the divine power. The latter danger appears in the current idea of a finite God. This idea is not distinctly modern. It is implied in polytheism, and has also at times been advocated by Christian thinkers. Marcion, for instance, in the second century distinguished between the Creator-God of the Old Testament and the good God of the New Testament. The latter he conceived of as a moral power working in a world which he had not made. The current idea of a finite God, while akin to the Marcionitic teaching has, of course, no direct connection with it. It has sprung up out of the empiricistic and pluralistic tendency in modern thought, on the one hand, and out of the modern recognition of the social value of religion, on the other. John Stuart Mill was the first to proclaim the new gospel.² It was then taken up by William James,³ and more recently has been popularized by H. G. Wells in his widely read book, "*God*

¹*A Theology for the Social Gospel*, p. 174f.

²*Three Essays on Religion*, pp. 242-257.

³*A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 310ff.

the Invisible King." Wells rejects the idea of God as Creator and as Providence, but the idea of God as Redeemer he enthusiastically advocates. "The ultimate of existence," he says, "is a Veiled Being, which seems to know nothing of life or death or good or ill."⁴ Concerning him or it we have no real knowledge. The true God, on the other hand, the Redeemer-God, is the God of our moral and mystical experience. His home is "in our hearts." He is a finite Being, and stands in an intimate and apparently dependent relation to humanity. "Somewhere," we are told, "in the dawning of mankind he had a beginning, an awakening, and as mankind grows he grows. With our eyes he looks out upon the universe he invades: with our hands he lays hands upon it. All our truth, all our intentions and achievements, he gathers to himself. He is the undying human memory, the increasing human will."⁵ Yet he is said to be a "person." "He is not merely the best of all of us, but a Being in himself, . . . an immortal being arising out of man, and external to the individual man."⁶ Wells' conception of God would thus seem to be a cross between theism and Comte's Religion of Humanity. If the existence of such a finite deity were admitted, we should still need an absolute Being to explain his origin. And this absolute or veiled Being would be the ultimate ground of religious faith, if such faith persisted. Religion as well as philosophy demands the absolute. Wells' finite deity is a nondescript being whose paternity neither philosophy nor religion would be willing to acknowledge. To him Haeckel's coarse jest about God as a "gaseous vertebrate" would properly apply. The finite god is not built into the universe in such a way as to give the impression of real existence. Rather is the idea of such a being a curio belonging in the museum of religious thought. Nevertheless, it is interesting and sig-

⁴*God, the Invisible King*, p. 14.

⁵*Ibid*, p. 61.

⁶*Ibid*, pp. 61, 85.

nificant as a speculative attempt to save the social passion of religion while surrendering its metaphysical basis.

In its doctrine of sin the social gospel emphasizes the idea of solidarity. This idea in theology is a two-edged sword. In one direction it cuts down the Pharisaic and Pelagian claim to righteousness on the part of the individual, but in the other direction it destroys the basis of individual responsibility. It is thus both a friend and foe to the Christian faith. It has been such in the past, and it is such again in the hands of the social gospel. In the traditional theology it took the form of the doctrine of original sin. This doctrine expresses the idea that sin is a super-individual reality, that it enslaves the individual so that redemption from it is impossible through self-effort, and can come only through divine grace. In this idea there is manifestly a fundamental religious truth, a truth of religious experience. Religion would be meaningless without it, or at least would be a very superficial factor in human life. But in the form in which it was often expressed in the past it seemed to deny human freedom, and hence in modern times there has been a tendency to reject it. Sin and guilt, it is pointed out, are inalienable; they cannot be detached from the individual. They cannot be transmitted from parent to child. The idea, therefore, that all men are somehow responsible for the sin of Adam and have inherited his guilt, must be regarded as a theological fiction. But while this has been the tendency in modern religious thought, the social gospel has to some extent run counter to it. It has laid stress on the social nature of sin, its super-individual character. "Sin," says Rauschenbusch, "is lodged in social customs and institutions and is absorbed by the individual from his social group."⁷ This view differs from the traditional doctrine of original sin in that it makes social tradition rather than heredity the main channel through which sin is transmitted. But this is merely a difference of emphasis. The two views agree in making sin

⁷*Ibid*, p. 61.

objective to the individual. There is a kingdom of sin as well as a kingdom of God. This idea was developed in a significant and fruitful way by Ritschl,⁸ and undoubtedly expresses a fact of human experience, whatever ultimate explanation of it may be given.

Stress on the objective power of sin may have one or the other of two different effects. It may deepen or it may weaken the consciousness of sin. The former result occurs in the case of highly sensitive, idealistic and mystical natures. They feel themselves as individuals involved in the guilt of humanity. The fact that they dwell among a people of unclean lips impresses them with a sense of their own sinfulness and helplessness. But this is not the usual result of the solidaric conception of sin. To most people it affords an opportunity to unload the responsibility for their own sins upon society. This is manifestly the prevailing tendency at present. The emphasis we are placing on social environment as the determining factor in human life is making the consciousness of sin less vivid than it was. The sense of guilt is less keenly felt. Men are not so aware of the need of repentance as they once were. The sinfulness of society is an excuse for the shortcomings of the individual rather than a challenge to action; and such it is likely to remain with most people. "What is everybody's business is nobody's business." This rule applies to sin as well as to duty. That it ought not to be so may be freely conceded, but that it is so can hardly be questioned. Emphasis on social solidarity has weakened the popular consciousness of sin, and the current doctrine of economic determinism has well nigh destroyed it in wide circles. It is therefore an urgent religious need that the onesidedness of the social gospel and of present social teaching be corrected at this point, and that the individual be reinstated in his central place in the moral life. For without the depth, the inwardness and inten-

⁸*Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 334-350.

sity of an acute sense of individual responsibility there can be no high development of religion.

The doctrine of redemption is so closely related to the doctrine of sin that here too we find the social gospel emphasizing the idea of solidarity, though it also stresses the ethical character of redemption. Redemption, as it is conceived by the social gospel, has three distinct aspects. It means the redemption of society as well as that of the individual; it means that the individual cannot be fully redeemed apart from the redemption of society; and it means that true redemption is ethical, not mystical in nature. The last conception is not distinctive of the social gospel. It is a common modern idea, and is one of the outstanding characteristics of the Ritschlian theology. The only difference between the Ritschlian standpoint and that of the social gospel is that the latter is inclined to interpret the word "ethical" in an exclusively "social" sense, thus depriving it to some extent of its inwardness and depth of meaning. But both agree in their antipathy to mysticism and in their conception of religion as primarily a matter of will and conduct. "Salvation," says Rauschenbusch, "is the voluntary socializing of the soul."⁹ The way to God is not above humanity but through it. This in general may be accepted as sound doctrine, but a onesided stress upon it tends to destroy the warmth and immediacy of religious experience. Mysticism as well as humanitarianism has its place in religion.

More distinctive of the social gospel is its conception of redemption as applicable to society as well as to the individual. There are great super-personal forces in human society that need to be destroyed. There is the titanic selfishness embodied in militarism, in imperialism, and in capitalism. There are numerous evil customs to which men are enslaved and great social and economic inequalities that have arisen without adequate justification. In the past the tendency was to accept

⁹*Ibid*, p. 99.

these evils as unavoidable and even as ordained of God. In one of the church hymns we have this stanza:

The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate,
God made them high or lowly
And ordered their estate.

But the present mood is very different. Men do not now look upon the inequalities and evils of the existing social order as an external fate to which they must submit. They regard society as plastic. And to this altered mood the church has responded with its doctrine of the redemption of society. Society, as well as the individual, can be saved from its sins, regenerated, and made anew. To this task, therefore, the exigencies of the present situation demand that the church devote itself with all the powers at its command. The conversion of individuals here and there will not suffice. Society itself must be converted, inwardly and outwardly transformed, so that it may be a fit home for the children of God. Nothing short of this will satisfy either the secular or the religious mood of our day.

It is, furthermore, an implication of the idea of solidarity that the redemption of the individual is dependent upon that of society. "If there cannot be an isolated personality," says A. C. McGiffert, "or an isolated character, there cannot be isolated salvation. Nobody can be saved *from* society, he must be saved *with* it. . . . To be saved in the full sense of the word means to be part of a saved race . . . Apart from such a Christianized society there is no real and abiding salvation for any man."¹⁰ To this position there need be no objection from the Christian standpoint, provided the freedom of the individual and his independence of external conditions are adequately protected. But at present the tendency is to put so much stress upon social environment that the individual is threatened with a new spiritual bondage. If men are so bound to the social organism that their only

¹⁰*The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*, pp. 277f.

hope lies in the transformation of the existing social order, then is there scant ground for the belief in the possibility of their redemption. If this is all that the social gospel has to offer to the toiling millions, its message of hope will in the end prove a mockery. It is not in the promised transformation of outward conditions that the gospel message is to be found. Such a message may have a certain religious value under existing circumstances. But "it must be remembered," as Harnack says, "that the chief task of the church is still the preaching of the Gospel, that is to say, the message of Redemption and of eternal life. Christianity as a religion would be at an end if this truth were obscured, and the gospel were to be changed into a social manifesto, whether for the sake of gaining popularity, or owing to excessive zeal for reform. More than that; none dare ultimately expect more *for himself* from the message of the church than a firm, consolatory faith, able to triumph over all the troubles of life."¹¹ It is here that we have the heart of the gospel. To the natural man it must seem that Jesus was guilty of an anti-climax when in his message to the Baptist after recounting the fact that "the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised," he ended by saying that "the poor have the gospel preached to them" (Matt. 11:5-6). What could be more worthless to the poor than the preaching of the gospel? What they manifestly need is material and physical help. Yet Jesus apparently cited his preaching of the gospel to them as the most important of his messianic credentials. In so doing what he meant to say was that, while the relief of suffering is important, more important is the inner power to triumph over the world. This power he declares is now, for the first time in human history, within the reach of the humblest classes. To them all life in spite of their hard lot may have a meaning and a value. That is the true gospel. As distinguished from it

¹¹*The Social Gospel*, p. 72.

the promise of a better social order no doubt serves also as a spiritual inspiration to men, but the promise is one that has never been realized in the way or to the extent expected. For men therefore to invest all their hopes in the improvement of social conditions is to court disappointment and despair. Far more important is it that the conviction be created within them that no matter how untoward circumstances may be, life for no one need be a failure. Victory over the world is possible to all through faith. To most men in our materialistic age this no doubt seems a vain dream, but even from their realistic standpoint it is less so than the utopia of socialism.

The point at which the social gospel diverges most sharply belief in the future life. It does not reject this belief, but it makes nothing of it. It is practically indifferent to it. Its from the traditional theology is in its attitude toward the own interests center in this world. In taking this attitude the social gospel, it seems to me, makes an undue concession to positivism and social radicalism. Positivism rules out the metaphysical altogether and leaves no place for a substantial soul. This type of thought has at present wide currency. Social radicalism sees in the belief in immortality simply a device of the ruling classes for keeping the oppressed masses in subjection. Against it, consequently, the bitterest scorn is vented. Even a socialist like Upton Sinclair, who refuses to be an enthusiastic disciple of Jesus, says, "If you can get a man to believing in immortality, there is no more left for you to desire: you can take everything he owns—you can skin him alive if it pleases you—and he will bear it with perfect good humor."¹² He then adds that the man who "got up" the idea of immortality was a "world-genius." In harmony with this is the tone and temper of the radical propaganda in general. One of the "I. W. W. Songs" has as its chorus these lines:

¹²*The Profits of Religion*, pp. 219f.

"You will eat, bye and bye,
In that glorious land above the sky;
Work and pray, live on hay,
You'll get pie in the sky when you die."

This scoffing attitude toward the belief in a future life on the part of social radicals no doubt has some justification. The belief does lend itself to an anti-social use, and such use has been made of it in the past. It is, of course, also a source of inspiration to social activity, but this is not so evident to the average mind, and even the religious mind often fails to draw the proper social inference from the belief. The result is that a sense of discord between the impulse to social activity and the belief in immortality has sprung up in the modern world, and the tendency is to encourage the former at the expense of the latter. This tendency is reflected in the negative or at least passive attitude of the social gospel toward the Christian hope.

But this position from the religious point of view is superficial and shortsighted. The religious spirit cannot be "cribbed and cabined" within the limits of humanity's earthly existence. By virtue of an inner necessity it reaches out toward the eternal and absolute; and from this standpoint a positivistic world, a merely earthly drama, has neither worth nor meaning. This truth has been expressed in words of "poignant beauty" by A. J. Balfour:

"We survey," he says, "the past and see that its history is of blood and tears, of helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigations, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thought will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief time broken the contented silence of the universe,

will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. Imperishable monuments and immortal deeds, death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had not been. Nor will anything that remains be better or be worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect."¹³

From such an outcome to the universe as this the human spirit instinctively recoils and seeks its comfort and its strength in the Christian hope. Nothing short of this hope will satisfy the deepest needs of the human soul; and between it and the social hope there need be no conflict. Rather do they, when properly understood, support each other. The thought of the Hereafter needs to be moralized, and the social hope needs to be rationalized and Christianized. We need, as H. F. Ward says, "to tie the social program up to the eternities and fill it with the power of an endless life."¹⁴ When this is done, it will be seen that Christianity instead of being the foe of progress is its only sure guarantee, and that the only abiding spring of social activity is to be found in the Christian hope.

"The Christian Ethos," says Troeltsch toward the close of his monumental work on *The Social Doctrine of the Christian Churches and Groups*, "alone places a goal before the eyes of us all who have to live and struggle through our difficult social existence—a goal which lies beyond all the relativities of the earthly life, and compared with which, every thing else represents only approximate values. The conviction of the Divine Kingdom of the future, which is but faith in the final realization of the Absolute, in whatever way we may conceive this realization, does not, as shortsighted opponents maintain, deprive the world and the life in the world of their value; but it makes the soul strong, throughout its various stages of progression, in the certainty of a last absolute meaning and aim for human toil. It thus raises the soul above the world without denying it. Only through this, the deepest insight of

¹³*Essays and Addresses*, p. 308.

¹⁴*Social Evangelism*, p. 24.

all Christian asceticism . . . do all social utopias become superfluous; and the impossibility, always preached anew by experience, of a full understanding and a full execution of the ideal, need not then throw back the seeker into that scepticism which so easily springs from an earnest veracity; and which is everywhere invading the finer spirits of our times. The Beyond is, in very truth, the power of our Now and Here."¹⁵

¹⁵P. 478 f; quoted by Baron von Hugel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 191f.

TWO BITS OF VERSE

BY RUTH IRVING CONNER

HIS MONUMENT

With his own hands he laid this length of wall,
An old man even then, bearded and bent,
Full of sweet natural wisdoms, such as lent
Unto his homeliest task, grace over all.
I used to sit for hours and watch the fall
Of stone on stone, counting each moment spent
With this unwearied Soul, my betterment.
Often that in his silences would call
Me to his side, there, I was sure to find
Him smiling down into the comely face
Of some old stone that gave, I thought, in kind
And recognized a friend. His resting place
This rugged hillside, and, as he had planned,
Here at his head the wall that knew his hand.

AFTER THE MESS OF POTTAGE COMES THE EXCEEDING GREAT CRY

Beside a little table simply laid
With checkered cloth of pattern white and red,
I ate my evening meal of milk and bread
As did become a well conditioned maid
Of puling age—All savorless and frayed
The cover of my years. Narrow my bed.
Ugly and mean the divers paths that led
From porringer upon whose rim I played
Tattoo that brought me ever more until
My appetite was lulled, to wealth of plate
That left but emptiness within its wake.
To all is granted prayer, I sought it late,
But oh, Lord God, this battered basin fill
That my poor soul in passing may partake!

THE PASSING OF ALICE MEYNELL

BY BELLE COOPER

The name of Alice Meynell had a secure place among the immortals long before the Victorian Age had run its course, or its great spokesmen were silent. She had just passed her teens when with her talented sister, who survives her, she brought out a volume of verse which contained one sonnet that at once took its place as a masterpiece, "Renouncement." In his admirable little volume, "*Sonnets of the Century*," William Sharp inserts it with two others of hers, remarking in the notes that Rossetti had mentioned it as one of the three best by women writers in the language. It had also Ruskin's high approval:

RENOUNCEMENT

I must not think of thee; and, tired yet strong,
I shun the thought that lurks in all delight—
The thought of thee—and in the blue Heaven's height,
And in the sweetest passage of a song.
Oh, just beyond the fairest thoughts that throng
This breast, the thought of thee waits, hidden yet bright;
But it must never, never come in sight;
I must stop short of thee the whole day long.

But when night comes to close each difficult day,
When night gives pause to the long watch I keep,
And all my bonds I needs must loose apart,
Must doff my will as raiment laid away—
With the first dream that comes with the first sleep,
I run, I run, I am gathered to thy heart.

The sonnet also finds a nook in Stedman's "*A Victorian Anthology*," which appeared several years before the century had run out. Only last November the *Atlantic Monthly* contained one of her poems, "Rivers Unknown to Song," written in her usual finished and thoughtful manner. Here is the closing stanza.

Man has no word for their eternity—
Rhine, Avon, Arno, younglings, youth uncrowned!
Ignorant, innocent, instantaneous, free,
Unwelcomed, unrenowned.

But even more representative and remarkable is what proved to be her *Ave atque Vale* poem, published in the November issue of the *London Mercury*, which reached New York almost simultaneously with the telegraphic news of the poet's passing. Since this high-class magazine, though now beginning its fifth year, and ably edited by Jack Collings Squire, is not popularly known on this side of the Atlantic, I quote the poem with its significant title:

AMEN

"He shall rise up at the voice of a bird."—*Ecclesiastes*.

Who then is "he?"

Dante, Keats, Shakespeare, Milton, Shelley; all
Rose in their greatness at the shrill decree,
The little, rousing, inarticulate call.

For they stood up
At the bird-voice, of lark, of nightingale,
Drank poems from that throat as from a cup.
Over the great world's notes did these prevail.

And not alone
The sacred poets woke. In listening man,
Woman, and child a poet stirs unknown,
Throughout the Mays of birds since Mays began.

He rose, he heard—
Our father, our Saint Peter, in his tears—
The crowing, twice, of the prophetic bird,
The saddest cock-crow of our human years.

The author's father, Thomas J. Thompson, was a Cambridge scholar of some distinction, who gave up a career at home in order to attend to the personal education of his girls. His adoring daughter Alice succinctly portrays him in a little four-page essay, saying: "Loving literature, he never lifted a pen except to write a letter. He had an exquisite style from which to refrain . . . The delicate, the abstinent, the reticent graces were his in the highest degree . . . He had always prayed temperate prayers and harbored probable wishes." Mr. Thompson was a native of York, of the best

Northern English stock, and a brother of the Mrs. Smithson of the Dickens intimate circle. Mr. Smithson was the professional gentleman connected with Yorkshire mentioned in the preface to *Nicholas Nickleby*. He had been introduced to Dickens by Thomas Mitton, the novelist's friend since the days both he and Mitton were law clerks in Lincoln's Inn. When Dickens wished to investigate boarding school conditions in Yorkshire, his former colleague gave him a letter of introduction to Mr. Smithson of York, who saw to it that the author of the projected satire on Yorkshire schools was given ample opportunity quietly to study conditions in the northern county. Indeed, so realistic was Dickens' portraiture of the brutal schoolmaster Squeers, that on the publication of *Nicholas Nickleby* several law suits for libel were threatened. The friendship thus begun with the Smithsons in York ripened in London; and later when Charles Dickens lost his pet raven "Grip," destined to play a leading part in *Barnaby Rudge*, it was Mr. Smithson who secured for him a second older and larger Grip.

Alice had also a talented mother. Her maiden name, Christina Weller, takes us back to the early forties when Charles Dickens was at the height of his fame, and the characters of his *Pickwick* were familiar to every one. Particularly did it make the name of Weller famous in the immortal "Sam." One evening in February, 1844, the novelist was presiding as chairman at an open meeting of the newly erected Mechanics' Institute in Liverpool; and it was part of his duties to introduce each performer. He came to a name that caused him a little embarrassment because of its associations. "I am requested," he said with a smile, "to introduce to you a lady whom I have some difficulty and tenderness in announcing, Miss Weller, who will play a *fantasia* on the pianoforte."

Later in the evening when Miss Weller was to play again, Dickens announced in the clear ringing voice beloved by the English-speaking public: "The godchild of whom I am so proud will oblige again." Her excellent performance, and

the peculiarity of her name, led Dickens to seek an introduction, and the next day he visited at the home of Mr. T. E. Weller. The friendly relations immediately established with the family are evidenced by the inscription in Miss Weller's autograph album of the following lines:

I put in a book once, by hook or by crook,
The whole race (as I thought) of a "feller,"
Who happily pleas'd the town's taste (much diseas'd),
And the name of this person was Weller.

I find, to my cost, that one Weller I lost,
Cruel Destiny so to arrange it!
I love her dear name which has won me some fame,
But, Great Heaven, how gladly I'd change it!

Christina was already a pianist of some note. She had been a precocious child, and at the age of seven had appeared publicly at Cheltenham, that home of culture by the Cotswold Hills, beloved of Anglo-Indians. Ten years later she made her debut in Dublin, where she played with Thalburg. She was also a composer of songs; wrote *The Atonement*, an oratorio with full orchestration; and musical accompaniment to renderings of Shakespeare's *A Midsummer's Night's Dream* and *The Tempest*.

Perhaps Dickens had something of the matchmaker in his make-up; for the very night that he first met Christina Weller he wrote a letter to his particular friend, T. J. Thompson. Other letters followed, and finally Mr. Thompson was induced to join the novelist's party for Italy. Not long after his return to England, Mr. Thompson married Miss Weller; and, being of independent means, the young couple chose Italy for their home. To her musical gifts Mrs. Thompson added skill with the brush; and gathered around her a distinguished circle of friends, including Mendelssohn, Millais, Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, John Bright, Jenny Lind, Grisi and Prince Lucien Bonaparte. Ruskin was particularly fond of her water-color drawings. She frequently exhibited at the London galleries; her best known oil painting is *The Morning of*

the Resurrection. The family kept up its friendship with Gadshill and the Dickenses; and Frederick Dickens, Charles' junior by eight years, and then a clerk in the treasury department, married Christina Weller's youngest sister.

A daughter was born to the Thompsons at Lausanne in Switzerland, in January, 1846, and was christened Elizabeth Southerden. Dickens sent a letter of congratulations from Rosemont, his Lausanne residence. As she grew up Elizabeth exhibited a talent for the brush. She studied first at Kensington, and then at the age of twenty-two she entered the studio of Signor Bellucci in Florence. Preferring national and military themes, she became, according to Ruskin, "the first fine pre-Raphaelite painter of battle scenes." Among the paintings she exhibited at the Royal Academy were "Missing," 1873; "The Roll Call," 1874; "Inkerman," 1877; "Scotland for Ever," 1881; and "Evicted," 1890. One of these—"The Roll Call"—caused a great sensation in artist circles, and was purchased by Queen Victoria for Windsor Castle. The accomplished painter was married in 1877 to a distinguished Irish soldier, Sir William Francis Butler, who has written some notable books on Canadian exploration, and was in command of the British forces in South Africa during the dark times of the Boer War. Their home was at Bansha Castle, Tipperary. Dying in the year 1910, he asked to be buried in Ireland, and the "request" was granted:

A REQUEST

Give me but six-feet-three (one inch to spare)
Of Irish ground, dig it anywhere
And for the poor soul say an Irish prayer
Above the ground.

Her sister Alice Christiana, four years Elizabeth's junior, was born in London in 1850—the same year as Charles Dickens' short-lived Dora Annie. Alice could distinctly remember Dickens coming into her nursery at Genoa; and in after years, when critics attacked the novelist's style, she took up the cudgels in his defense. Early in life she went over to

the Church of Rome, and was followed by other members of the family; she was educated amid Catholic surroundings, and this atmosphere pervades her poems and other writings. The scheme of accomplishments which Mr. Thompson devised for his two daughters provided that they should be good swimmers, billiard players, and marksmen with the pistol. The outdoor and animal life at the family country house in Kent probably gave the direction to the elder daughter's artistic bent. Steeple chases, battles, and stampedes of wild horses were the subject of her earliest drawings. While Elizabeth was gaining fame with her brush, Alice at the age of twenty published a small volume called *Preludes*, for which her sister Elizabeth made the illustrations. It contained a sonnet, "My Garden," beginning with the quatrain:

My heart shall be thy garden. Come, my own,
Into thy garden; thine be happy hours
Among my fairest thoughts, my tallest flowers,
From root to crowning petal thine alone.

It took the fancy of a young literary man, a native of Yorkshire, and educated at York, Wilfrid Meynell—pronounced Ménal—to whom she was married the very same year her sister became the wife of Colonel Butler. Meynell, who wrote under the *nom-de-plume* of John Oldcastle, afterwards became known as a brilliant journalist; he was editor of *The Tablet*, *The Weekly Register*, and a contributor to the *Nineteenth Century*—which was published by a Catholic firm, Kegan, Paul & Co., and had Catholic sympathies—the *Athenaeum* and other of the leading periodicals. He was also at one time editor of the *Dublin Review*, a Catholic monthly of high standing. In 1915 he published anonymously *Aunt Sarah and the War*, which had an unprecedented circulation.

Together the Meynells started on a career of letters. Their hospitable home at 21 Phillimore Terrace—which George III is said to have called Dishclout Terrace, because of the scroll work above the doors—was close to the Pro-Cathedral at Kensington, where every morning they heard mass before

beginning the labors of the day. They were in close touch with Cardinal Manning, that great social force and ecclesiastical leader; and Meynell's *Register* became his personal organ in the fight he waged against intemperance and other evils. The Cardinal also contributed to Meynell's other paper, *Merry England*. "I am ashamed of myself," he wrote on one occasion when sending an article, "but the enclosed may go, and if your readers only laugh at me it will make *Merry England* merrier."

Naturally many of the articles Mr. Meynell used came from the gifted pen of his wife. In 1893 Alice Meynell, as one of its six women writers, began to conduct a weekly article in the "Wares of Autolycus" column of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, founded as a paper "Written by Gentlemen for Gentlemen," and published every Friday under the distinguished editorship of Henry Cust. He and William Ernest Henley were then the London editors whose praise young writers were greedy to catch. A group of Mrs. Meynell's Bacon-like essays appeared in book form, but it was twenty years after her first volume of poems had come out before her second volume, called "Later Poems," appeared. After Tennyson's death, Coventry Patmore in the *Saturday Review* suggested Mrs. Meynell for the laureateship. How fitting it would have been to have a woman Laureate to Queen Victoria! And indeed Mrs. Meynell might have adorned it better than did Alfred Austin—also a Roman Catholic, by the way. In 1913—the year that Robert Bridges received the laureateship—her poems were collected, with a few additions, only seventy-six in all, but of decidedly superior workmanship and exquisite simplicity of language. A later poem, called *A Father of Women, and Other Poems*, was issued in 1917; and in her closing year her Muse—too often silent—more frequently inspired her pen. Now she has to her credit a full century of poems.

Alice Meynell has but one note in her song, but it is a pure lyric one. She has given an excellent description of herself and her art in a sonnet called

CHANGELESS

A poet of one mood in all my lays,
Ranging all life to sing one only love,
Like a west wind across the world I move,
Sweeping my harp of floods mine own wild ways.
The countries change, but not the west-wind days
Which are my songs. My soft skies shine above,
And on all seas the colors of a dove,
And on all fields a flash of silver grays.

I make the whole world answer to my art
And sweet monotonous meanings. In your ears
I change not ever, bearing, for my part,
One thought that is the treasure of my years,
A small cloud full of rain upon my heart
And in mine arms, clasped like a child in tears.

Many know the names of Wilfrid and Alice Meynell best because of their appreciation of the gifted author of *The Hound of Heaven*. But for these two good Samaritans Francis Thompson would probably never have been known, but would have filled a pauper's grave in the great city whither he had drifted. They gave not only literary encouragement but a place in their own home to this erratic young genius. Francis Thompson had been educated at Ushaw College, Durham, and Owen's College, Manchester; but disappointed his parents by not becoming a priest or a doctor, and left his Manchester home to seek his fortune in London. Unfortunately, as he was addicted to the use of opium, his literary efforts were either spasmodic or were apt to come to naught. He had, however, written an essay on *Paganism, Old and New*; and, lacking the stamps to mail it, dropped it and a poem in the box of the editor of *Merry England*. The badly soiled and uninviting manuscript was at first pigeon-holed; but six months later it was read by the over-taxed editor and estimated at its true worth. Mr. Meynell hastened to com-

municate with the author, who, with his characteristic carelessness had concluded the accompanying letter with the request: "Kindly address your rejection to the Charing Cross Post Office." The editor's letter was returned through the dead letter office, and the essay lay on the Meynells' desk for a year. Meanwhile the homeless Francis Thompson, reduced to terrible poverty, was holding horses' heads in the Strand, or selling matches on the streets of London, and living the dreary life of a social outcast.

Finally Mr. Meynell resolved to publish the poem, "Passion of Mary," which had accompanied the poet's essay, hoping thus to get in touch with the author. A few days later he received a lengthy letter from Thompson asking the fate of the article he had submitted, and giving the address of a chemist's shop in Drury Lane. In due time Thompson came in to get his periodic supply of opium, and was asked to call at the editorial office of *Merry England*.

Some time later the Meynells invited him to their Kensington home, where for nineteen years he was one of the inner circle of the family. Few households presided over by an exquisitely dainty matron could have endured the disarrangement of order and conventions as the Meynells did. Then began a rebirth of Francis Thompson's spirit under the benign influence of the motherly and sisterly woman whom he has described in "Fair Love:":

How could I gage what beauty is her dole,
Who cannot see her countenance for her soul,
As birds see not the casement for the sky?
And, as 'tis check they prove its presence by,
I know not of her body till I find
My flight debarred the heaven of her mind.

With pain and renunciation the poet transmuted his earthly affection for his rescuer into a spiritual communion. For him Pain became an instrument of Joy:

Know that at end,
Pain was well paid, sweet Friend,
Pain was well paid which brought me to your sight.

In a passage of self-revelation, Francis Thompson says of his inward struggle that "it left that lady still the first, the one veritable, full-orbed and apocalyptic love of my life. Through her was shown me the uttermost of what love could be—the possible divinities and celestial prophecies of it. None other could have taught them quite thus, for none other had in her the like unconscious latencies of utter spirituality. Surely she will one day realize this, as by her sweet, humble, and stainless life she has deserved to do." And the fair lady whom the poet worshipped has left this record of his friendship: "During many years of friendship, and almost daily companionship, it was evident to solicitous eyes that he was one of the most innocent of men."

The summer home of the Meynells, situated not far from the extensive new buildings of Christ's Hospital—the famous old "Blue Coat School"—is at Pulborough in Sussex, the county so loved by Rudyard Kipling, John Drinkwater and Wilfrid Scawen Blunt. The last named assisted the Meynells in caring for Francis Thompson, giving the consumptive the use of a pavilion on his Sussex estate, Crabbett Park. To quote some lines from Drinkwater:

For peace, than knowledge more desirable,
Into your Sussex quietness I came,
When summer's green and gold and azure fell
Over the world in flame.

The Meynell family is a numerous and happy one, numbering both boys and girls. The second son, Everard, who married the Buffalo singer, Grazie Carbone, has made a valuable contribution to contemporary biography in his *Life of their childhood poet-friend*.

Viola, like her mother, is able to handle the sonnet but it is as a novelist that she is winning a secure place. Her first book, "*Martha Vine*," which appeared anonymously, was handled respectfully by the critics as the work of a conscientious writer who had studied character closely and precisely. Then followed "*A Love Story of Simple Life*," "*Cross-in-*

Hand Farm," and "*Lot Barrow*." The last shows a growing perfection of technique. A later novel, "*Modern Lovers*," reveals no symptom of carelessness or conventionality. The effect of environment on character is studied with effectiveness in her analysis of the Rutherglen family—the stubborn father, the foolish mother and the two sympathetically drawn girls. "*Narcissus*," and "*Second Marriage*" are her latest contributions to the world of novels.

And now to return to the gifted mother, whose loss is sincerely regretted over the English-speaking world. Very noble is her poem upon the heroic Edith Cavell, a kindred spirit:

NURSE EDITH CAVELL

(Two o'clock the morning of October 12, 1915)

To her accustomed eyes
The midnight-morning brought not such a dread
As thrills the chance-awakened head that lies
In trivial sleep on the habitual bed.

'Twas yet some hours ere light;
And many, many, many a break of day
Had she outwatched the dying; but this night
Shortened her vigil was, briefer the way.

By dial of the clock
'Twas day in the dark above her lonely head.
"This day thou shalt be with Me." Ere the cock
Announced that day she met the Immortal Dead.

Many writers consider that "*The Thrush Before Dawn*," which appeared over her name in the London *Athenaeum*, is the greatest poem inspired by a bird since Shelley's "*Skylark*."

THE THRUSH BEFORE DAWN

A voice peals in this end of night
A phrase of notes resembling stars,
Single and spiritual notes of light.
What call they at my window-bars?
The South, the past, the day to be,
An ancient infelicity.

Darkling, deliberate, what sings
 This wonderful one, alone, at peace?
 What wilder things than song, what things
 Sweeter than youth, clearer than Greece,
 Dearer than Italy, untold
 Delight, and freshness centuries old?

And first-loves, a multitude,
 The exaltation of their pain;
 Ancestral childhood long renewed;
 And midnights of invisible rain;
 And gardens, gardens, night and day.
 Gardens and childhood all the way.

What Middle Ages passionate,
 O passionless voice! What distant bells
 Lodged in the hills, what palace state
 Illyrian! For it speaks, it tells,
 Without desire, without dismay,
 Some morrow and some yesterday..

All—natural things! But more—whence came
 This yet remoter mystery?
 How do these starry notes proclaim
 A graver still divinity?
 This hope, this sanctity of fear?
O innocent throat! O human ear!

The charm of Alice Meynell's tall, slight figure, with its intellectual head, balanced poise, and radiant spirituality, is preserved in the well known drawing by Sargent. It was thus that the poet appeared when she made her one brief lecture tour in America early in this our twentieth century. Those who saw her recall vividly her thoughtful discourse delivered with a peculiarly distinct enunciation; her large, dreamy eyes like mournful stars in a haunting face of spiritual beauty; and a restraint and modesty of manner akin to aloofness. Her wonderful dark brown eyes, reflecting, as Francis Thompson phrases it, "Passionless passion, wild tranquillities," were usually wide open. Her frame always seemed frail, thin and delicate. A London literary friend, who spent a delightful afternoon with Alice Meynell just a few weeks before her death, writes that her brown hair, untouched by

years, was piled rather high on her tall, narrow head, and her neck was encircled by a black velvet band holding a bow of black chiffon under the pale firm chin. A sympathetic smile, a beautifully modulated voice, and exquisite manners enhanced deeply her winsomeness.

The Meynell country home in Sussex is an ancient rambling farmhouse, partly fitted with modern conveniences. The extensive grounds contain a fine open-air swimming bath, a beautiful rectangular sheet of water, eight feet deep at one end and surrounded by lovely woods. The spacious living-room has a great open hearth where an immense fire of logs is always blazing and crackling. It was here that Alice Meynell spent the last months before her spirit flitted to the "Larger Room."

The poet and dramatist, John Drinkwater, has already been quoted as a lover of Sussex, fond of the same surroundings as Kipling and the Meynells. Here is his warm tribute to his neighbor and friend:

TO ALICE MEYNELL

I too have known my mutinies,
 Played upon improvident desires,
Gone indolently vain as these
 Whose lips from undistinguished choirs
 Mock at the music of our sires.

I too have erred in thought. In hours
 When needy life forbade me bring
To song the brain's unravished powers,
 Then had it been a temperate thing
 Loosely to pluck an easy string.

Yet thought has been, poor profligate,
 Sin's period. Through dear and long
Obedience I learn to hate
 Unhappy lethargies that wrong
 The larger loyalties of song.

And you upon your slender reed,
 Most exquisitely tuned, have made
For every singing heart a creed.
 And I have heard; and I have played
 My lonely music unafraid.

Knowing that still a friendly few,
Turning aside from turbulence,
Cherish the difficult phrase, the due
Bridals of disembodied sense
With the new word's magnificence.

This tribute from a leading poet of today to Alice Meynell's wonderful influence as an inspirer of high ideals in thought and expression, may serve as a fitting close to this sketch of one whose passing shadowed the closing days of November, 1922. In the bright mist of a winter morning—the day before our national Thanksgiving holiday—her body was laid in Kensal Green cemetery near the grave of the author of *The Hound of Heaven*, who had celebrated his rescuer in a devout cycle of songs.

DANTE

JULIA JOHNSON DAVIS.

Always apart, while other children played,
Wandering alone in meadow or in wood,
(His comrade only some dim earth drawn shade),
Troubled at night by dreams half understood.

And as he grew he missed all simple joy,
Laughter he knew not, though the hot tears ran;
A shadow world his life as when a boy—
Strange, lonely child, and vision-haunted man.

CURRENT THOUGHT

Dr. Perry Becomes Personalistic

An eminent example of clear thinking with respect to the meaning of personality and its relation to society as a whole is to be found in the *Journal of Philosophy* of February fourteenth. Doctor Ralph Barton Perry criticizes, under the title *Is Society a Person*, the standpoint of Durkheim, "if there is to be any morality, or system of duties and obligations, society must be a moral person qualitatively distinct from the individual persons which it comprises."

One does not expect to find Dr. Perry in the ranks of the Personalists, the article in question is therefore all the more welcome and remarkable for we find him dismissing the contention that personality can be a collection of states, an aggregate of mind-stuff or a "stream" of consciousness because it does not provide for the experienced unity of consciousness. Likewise the notion that personality may be compounded into a "social person," after the sociological manner of speech, is dismissed as being contrary to the known privacy of personality. Neither, he declares, is personality "the systematic unity of experience or the organization of objects into a world." We have here what seems to us almost an abrogation of the earlier type of neo-realism in which the reality is neither thinker nor thing but the *relation* between them. His perspicacity is shown in his conclusion that the essence of personality lies in its *acts*. This would seem to us to imply an *actor* and if so Dr. Perry might be congratulated on having taken the personalistic position. But to quote:

"There remains the view that a person is an organization not among the objects of mind, but among its *acts*. We may, in order to avoid unnecessary argument, agree loosely that acts of mind are acts of knowledge or acts of will. My thesis may then be briefly stated as follows: There are two ways in which acts of mind are integrated. They are integrated directly as acts of one agent, or

indirectly through their objects. The former is the type of integration that is characteristic of personality and allied forms of mind; the latter is characteristic of society. In other words, society is an integration of mind, and a genuinely psychological unity, but it is not that specific mode of integration or unity which constitutes a person."

Our only demurrer would be to his presumption that personality must necessarily imply a physical organism. Granted that such organism is necessary to personality as we commonly know it, we do not feel justified in asserting that personality cannot exist without body, for the *acts* of personality proceed from a source which cannot be *materially* located and this most important element of personality seems most immaterial. Nevertheless we welcome the progress which some neo-realists are making toward a clearer view of the meaning of personality.

Can the Church Do Without Education?

J. M. Powis Smith writing on "*The Church and Education*" in *The Journal of Religion* for January calls attention to the inseparable interests of the church and education:

"Religion and education are in the very nature of things inseparable. For the church to prohibit or restrict in any way the pursuit of knowledge is to imperil her own future; if not indeed to commit suicide. There must be open and free commerce of ideas. The spirit of research must be encouraged and fostered if the church is to keep alive and alert, able and willing to serve her generation to the uttermost. If the task of the church is to interpret the world, she must know what that world is and how it came to be what it is. Science in its various branches, such as chemistry, physics, geology, astronomy, astrophysics, botany, and zoology, will enlighten her to the nature of her physical universe with its fauna and flora; and she dare not shut her eyes to the light coming from these quarters, a lesson that great numbers of Christians have yet to learn. . . .

"Religion has no need to be afraid of facts. Facts in themselves have never brought injury to the cause of truth and righteousness. Neglect and perversion of the facts or refusal to let them have their way has always been, and will always be, fraught with trouble for religion and the church."

In the very nature of the case the church must seek to know the truth and constantly to readjust herself to the discoveries of science. Any failure in her devotion to the *whole* truth cannot but break down all the bulwarks of true religion:

"There are blind leaders in many religious groups today who would have us turn our backs upon truth and fact. They seek to read reality out of the universe. They would identify religion with ignorance, superstition and fear. They refuse to learn anything new or to unlearn ancient errors. They would tell the scholar what he should teach, though they themselves know nothing as it should be known. And all this is put forward in the name of real religion! If such counsels should prevail, the church is ruined. She will lose the confidence and support of thinking people and will speedily become an institution for the feeble-minded. It is the function of our church schools to save her from such a fate and to enable her so to adjust herself to the facts of history and experience that she will challenge the admiration and win the devotion of the strongest and best."

Mistaking Imagination for Science

The ancient trick of assuming as real whatever one can imagine, which used to be charged against theology, has become the main bulwark of defense in a certain popular type of scientific writing. Professor Oliver L. Reiser in the January *Monist* sets forth the theme, "*Life as a Form of Chemical Behavior.*" He begins by asserting that his aim is to account for life "without invoking a vital force or non-biological entity." With such a start, namely the assumption that monism is correct, he proceeds to consider such facts and probabilities as are in keeping with his theory and to discount all

others. Every type of special pleading is resorted to, including the one so frequently used by scientists that though the assumed facts are wanting in any known case, they will be present if we give them time:

“While it must be admitted that there is no mechanical model adequate to all the facts of living matter, in the light of what has already been achieved, the biologist may legitimately believe that this model will be forthcoming in the future.”

Then follow such statements as these: “Protoplasm in animals behaves the same as that found in plants.” We will agree to the truth of the statement except in the *only* point important for the discussion. They do not behave the same when it comes to the real function of protoplasm to propagate. Plant protoplasm propagates plants and animal protoplasm propagates animals. In other words the important fact about protoplasm, is not its chemical constituents but what it will do. A similar reply could be made to the contention that “many of the phenomena of living matter can be duplicated in the behavior of non-living matter.” That is true but these phenomena are not the *essential* ones. Non-essential likenesses cannot ground essential differences.

Another of these loose statements is that “rust accumulating on iron is growing as a cell grows by increasing its size through chemical action.” We submit that this overlooks completely the nature of a living cell.

The author, throughout the discussion, assumes that the description of activity is a sufficient explanation of it. This is particularly true of his attempt to define a living organism. He rests under a further fallacy of language when he assumes that the application of inorganic terms to organic life is a reduction of organic to the inorganic. It is merely a reduction of language which does not change the scientific facts. Thus he is led to assume that an analogue is the same as an identity:

"On the basis of these unifying generalizations it can now be said that the behavior of solutions, osmotic pressure, equilibrium constants, etc., have their analogues in inorganic chemical and physical systems."

Where the facts lag behind he falls back on probability, such as the assumption that "the interior and the exterior of protoplasm probably differ in their electrical charge, the surface of the cell being charged negatively."

Thus he arrives at certain empirical laws which accord with his heart's desire, the first of which is this: "Structure determines function. An organism is a definite organization of organs or structures. Physiological tissues differ in function because of differences in physical-chemical structure." Whereupon we would be permitted to demand wherein the brain of a Newton, so far as chemical differences go, differs from the brain of an ass.

When he describes memory as "etchings on the protoplasm by [which] external stimuli leave reaction tendencies, called engrams, as evidence of experience," he seems to us to be mistaking imagination for science. It would be well for him to be guided by his own warning. "The impulse to reify a function is due to the tendency to hypostatize whatever can be labelled with a term."

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A Loop-hole for Joy

For Wannellyn there was a professional ideal. Its rocks and timbers had been laid with painful care. The idea was that it should be so chinked and battened that neither bird nor "beast should go up thereon."

But alas for human expectation! Was it partner or myself that overlooked that hole in the peak? What time the drowsy summer afternoon invoked to slumber, the professor was aroused by a flurry of wings, and looking up, saw the perkier of all perky mountain wrens hurrying about, inspecting every rock and log in the most systematic and business-like way. And in the midst of labors so exacting there came as sweet a song as is rarely heard from any bird. Then it was that human forgetfulness was justified. What joy over the failure of an ideal. The hole in the peak which had looked so reprovingly had turned out to be a loop-hole for joy. How often do we batten our lives hard and fast with duty, with trivial task and imagined obligation, with convention and much ado so that joy cannot reach us. Every effort is spent to make life smug and comfortable like that of the man who locked his barns and said "Soul take thine ease, thou hast much goods laid up for many years;" but taking one's ease means death.

Your grandmother and mine used to tell of the village fool who, when order to cut a hole into the woodshed for the cat, cut two, a large one for the cat and a small one for the kitten. Gracious fool! How is he to be envied in these systematic days of completeness, of surveys and investigations, of dieting and thinking health, until we find time for everything but the important.

It might be better for us if we would emulate occasionally the village fool by making many entrances into life for the contingent and the accidental. We are systematic even in our attempted joys, forgetting that joy cannot be commandeered but is incidental as the shining of the sun after the shower, or the chance brook by the wayside, or the whirl of wings through the chaparral. In our house of life should be left a loop-hole for joy.

F.

The Curse of Possessions

When shall we learn that it is the possession of many things that hinders, worries and tires us?

The sannyasis or sages of India, in their earnest quest for the soul's salvation, go forth into the forest to meditate, after freeing themselves from the curse of things. It is their conviction that no man can think deep thoughts, pure thoughts, large thoughts, so long as he is harrassed by the thought of transporting, housing and caring for worldly effects. Sages they are in reality—then have the courage of their convictions.

We go away for a vacation of a few days, taking with us in a suitcase only a change of clothing and a couple of books. We suspect that we cannot stay away very long from our things, yet we prolong our stay and are content to have with us just the bare necessities. We meet interesting people. We converse on new themes. We live. What is of importance in our lives we carry in our souls. What is left behind in our houses seems to dwindle in significance. We can get along without it, for we have already done so. We feel free.

Then we return and immediately find that we are again the bond-slaves of superfluous effects. Our fine resolutions to free ourselves from the trammels of sordid possessions are weakened. We have not the courage to resign our janitorship. The yogi's bowl and the simple life are not for us.

The very peace-plenty of prosperity of our lands fills our lives with petty cares. A devastation by war, flood or fire might remove the curse from us, but our unaided wills are impotent for the task.

We console ourselves by believing that we could muster the heroism of the sannyasi, had we to forsake only his small store of commodities and that he in our shoes would be correspondingly diffident—a sop to our wills!

KARL T. WAUGH.

“The Discovery of God,” by Basil King

This book deserves a warm welcome as contribution by a literary craftsman to a better knowledge of the Holy Scriptures in their essence. He uses the term “fundamentals” in the proper way as convictions at the base of spiritual progress; and declares that “to see the Bible as the mirror of man's spiritual progress” has been his only aim in writing the book.

He denies that this spiritual progress is a species of evolution, for “Evolution implies modification, adaption, and a process by which that which was suited to one element changes in such a way as to become suited to another. . . . In the discovery of God there is nothing that resembles this. There is change on the part of man, but not so much in modification as in growth.”

It is a pity that the survey is so closely confined to the Hebraic-Greek-Latin literature and its traditions. Cyrus, who is designated the “Anointed of the Lord” in Isaiah, and who brought the riches of Zoroastrian dealings with the divine to the exiled Jews, is mentioned merely as a conqueror like Napoleon. Nor is there any reference to such a noble and impassioned searching after God as the “Song Celestial,” the heart of the great Indian epic the Mahabharata. Its teachings have done much to make Oriental thought helpful to our European philosophy.

JAMES MAIN DIXON

Personalism and Structural Psychology

To the Editor of THE PERSONALIST—

It may be permitted an advocate of what William McDougall criticizes, unjustly as it seems to us, as an "atomistic or mosaic psychology," who is at the same time an enthusiastic Personalist, to comment upon the article of Professor Calkins in your January number.

Structuralist, (including under that term those who regard the structural point of view as an incomplete but nevertheless necessary point of view in psychology) resent the misleading appellation hurled at them by Dr. McDougall on the ground that it unfairly confuses structuralism as a phase of psychological method with the now discarded associationist metaphysics. We do not regard the mind as a mosaic of atomistic ideas or mental elements, but as a system of events which yield on analysis such elements. The elements do not exist first in the concrete, and then become concatenated into complexes: rather, the complex mental events first take place, and then become analyzed by the psychologist. Mental complexes, including that great complex of complexes which we call the mind, are concrete phenomena: mental elements are products of abstraction.

Those of us who are both structuralists (at least in part) in psychology and Personalists in metaphysics, may find much with which to sympathize in the position of Robert McDougall, whom Professor Calkins quotes with approval in her article. By us, as by him, the term "mind" is preferred to "self" to designate the subject-matter of psychology²; to us, as to him, this mind is a "complex of thoughts, feelings, and actions"³—a "system of related characteristics and activities" (p. 186)—and "every event in the mental life" a "phenomenon to be described" rather than "interpreted" (p. 189), and to be related "to the system within which it is found" (p. 210).⁴ We have no objection to admitting with him that "all psychology is the psychology of self" (p. 209), if by "self" he means "mind" as above defined. So far as "self" is defined as the system of mental phenomena, or as the object of that "specific form of experience" which we call self-consciousness, it may, as R. McDougall writes (p. 188), "be approached by psychological methods; but as the universal and necessary ground of reference in all individual experiences (i. e., the "I"), it does not properly fall within the psychologist's field at all"—and it is in this latter sense that the term is used in his statement that "every mental fact is the experience of some self" (p. 185)⁵.

¹See *Foundations of Psychology* (Princeton University Press, 1921); especially sections 14, 18, 19, 23.

²*General Problems of Psychology*, p. 208.

³Loc. cit.

⁴Cf. *Foundations*, sections 50-52.

⁵Also in W. McDougall's proposition that "all experience or thinking is the experiencing or thinking of some one." (Outline, p. 40, quoted by Miss Calkins.)

The structuralist, then, is not an atomist; and he is not necessarily an enemy of Personalism any more than, as Miss Calkins points out, the self-psychologist is necessarily an advocate of that metaphysical doctrine. The present writer gladly accepts the term "personalism" for his own position—that Personality, Spirit, Selfhood is the only Ultimate Reality, and that everything which is real in any sense is either a Self or the object of some self. He accepts for himself heartily also the quotation from Professor Pratt, and agrees with Professor Calkins in her criticism of H. W. Carr's distinction between science and philosophy. He hopes, however, that the Personalist will not regard the structuralist in psychology as any the less sympathetic by virtue of his scientific position with the metaphysical position of those who place the Self, as he does, in the very centre of the universe of reality. It is his very interest in and exaltation of the Self which leads him to align himself with Croce and Gentile rather than with Wm. McDougall and M. W. Calkins in the Italians' distinction between the functions of philosophy as concerned with persons and psychology as concerned with mental processes. This does not in the least, however, seem to him to detract from the force of Miss Calkins' argument that the Personalist, even more than his opponents, should be interested in psychology—the science which has to do with the phenomenal expressions of that entity which as philosopher he regards as the most fundamental of all realities. The forces that bind Personalists together are far stronger than, and should be emphasized over, those forces which separate the structuralist from the self-psychologist.

(Signed) JARED S. MOORE, PH. D.,
*Associated Professor, Department of Philosophy,
Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio,*

Reply of Dr. Calkins to Dr. Moore

The Editor of THE PERSONALIST has given me the opportunity to comment on Professor Moore's letter. With Dr. Moore's main thesis I am, of course, in entire agreement. Certainly the structuralist in psychology is not "necessarily an enemy" of philosophical Personalism; in other words, the Personalist in philosophy is not inevitably a self-psychologist. Yet it remains true that Personalistic philosophy has more to learn from self-psychology than from psychology of any other type.

To touch briefly on the more specifically psychological questions raised by Dr. Moore: he does not seem to me successful in the attempt to defend structural psychology from the charge of being over-abstract by his entirely justified assertion that, for the structural psychologist, "complex mental events first take place" and only later "become analyzed by the psychologist." For, to the self-psychologist, mental events, however complex, are themselves abstractions from the experiencing self. I have discussed the points at issue between Dr. Moore and me in a review of

his "*Foundations of Psychology*" published in the *Journal of Philosophy* of January, 1923, to which in the July number of the same *Journal* Dr. Moore makes reply. I permit myself to add a comment upon Dr. Moore's plea (*Journal of Philosophy XX*, 411f.) that a structural psychologist may properly "define recognition as involving the idea of a persisting self, binding together the more or less discrete moments of consciousness" on the ground that "the 'persisting self' of recognition is really a philosophical inference from the 'feeling of familiarity' which accompanies the memory experience." A structural psychologist who defines recognition in terms of self seems not only to admit the inadequacy of the structural procedure but also tacitly to transfer the self from metaphysics into psychology.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

Along the Bookshelf

EINSTEIN, Philosopher, Physicist or Magician

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM, by VISCOUNT HALDANE.
Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut. P. xiv—302.

SUBSTANCE AND FUNCTION AND EINSTEIN'S THEORY
OF RELATIVITY, by ERNEST CASSIRER. Tr. by WILLIAM
CURTIS SWABEY and MARIE COLLINS SWABEY. The Open Court
Publishing Co., Chicago. Pp. xvi-465.

EINSTEIN AND THE UNIVERSE, by CHARLES NORDMANN,
Astronomer of the Paris Observatory. Henry Holt. Co., New
York. Pp. xvi-240.

THE IDEA OF EINSTEIN'S THEORY, by J. H. THIRRING,
Professor of Physics in the University of Vienna. Robert M.
McBride & Co., New York.

A PRIMER OF HIGHER SPACE, by CLAUDE BRAGDON. Sec-
ond Revised Edition. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Pp. 81.

FOUR-DIMENSIONAL VISTAS, by CLAUDE BRAGDON. Sec-
ond Edition Revised. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Pp. 155.

After all, is Einstein to be accounted in the company of the philosophers? One's answer will depend largely upon one's view of philosophy. Mr. J. E. Turner returns a decided "no;" Viscount Haldane says "yes." We have cast our lot with Haldane because the conception of space and time is determinative of any philosophy. Let them be looked upon as independent entities which exist to hold things or which roll themselves out indefinitely to contain events, and one has passed down the crossroads toward the conclusions of materialism and not all the king's horses nor all the king's men can hold back the inevitable logical conclusion.

With space and time viewed under the form of relativity or defined as related to planes of reference we have a spatial and temporal reality amenable to mind and in keeping with Personalism and idealism. This result follows however much Einstein may deny it. The philosophical importance and implication cannot be denied nor avoided. This inseparable relation of the conception of time and space to the philosophical problem has become apparent to Haldane, who hastens to draw certain philosophical conclusions. These conclusions are of the utmost moment and interest to Personalists. He has no such illusions as those which led Spencer to deny self-consciousness because self-consciousness implies the identity of subject and object and was therefore impossible. Neither the world nor the person, in Haldane's judgment, can be taken apart from their relations:

"We are thus forced back to the *subject*, which is itself no event happening in externality, for the explanation of the world as it actually seems to us. By subject we mean here neither a thing in space nor an activity in space. We mean that for which such things and activities are, and apart from which they have no significance and so no reality. Thus interpreted the presence of the subject aspect of reality, of knowledge as that to which reality is essentially relative, is everywhere apparent, even in what, looked at superficially, we take to be a mere object world."

He announces his purpose as the search for a common denominator of all knowledge and this he seems to find in his "universal concrete" which, study as we will, seems none other than our old friend personality under another name:

"The ultimate form, the foundational fact in our experience, is the concrete universal, the unique and unambiguous individuality in which the actual is always self-presenting. This is so in daily life as much as in abstract science, and it is so because this form of individuality is foundational in all knowledge when freed from the relativity we impose on it. We seem to be here contemplating mind as having for its essence freedom and self-direction. . . . Should this conception prove well founded it furnishes a new light on the significance for us of the universe itself." Many will be thus reminded of Bowne's definition of personality as a center of self-consciousness and self-direction. And of this notion Haldane declares: "Should this conception prove well founded it furnishes a new light on the significance for us of the universe itself."

While the chief interest of the book for the Personalist will likely gather about the discussion of Humanism, which fills the first part, Part II, with its discussions of various subjects of mathematical physics, biology and psychology is only second in significance and will repay careful examination. Among other items he shows the impossibility of defining or successfully conceiving life from any mechanistic standpoint whatever. Here he discloses the weakness of much present-day biological and psychological discussion which determines to pour life into mechanistic moulds and so is never able to come to more than a partial and essentially inadequate conception of it.

Cassirer's *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity* has an importance for the world of philosophy quite apart from its discussion of the philosophical implications of the Einstein Theory. It is important that this work has at last become available through translation to those who do not easily read German. The fundamental philosophical aspects of the various sciences need correlation if there is ever to come a time of greater illumination and cooperation between the now sundered areas of scholarly research and effort. This book concerns itself with the philosophy of the sciences. We have here set forth

in historical form the rise of the logical concepts of number, space, time, geometry, substance, energy, the chemical "atom" and the "reality" of natural science.

The second portion of the book deals with the transformations which conceptions of questions of fact undergo "when regarded from the general point of view that is gained by criticism of the exact sciences, and the new direction which their solution takes."

The Positivism of a generation or two ago made such impact upon the world of culture that it brought about a general separation of science from philosophy and a wide disparagement of the latter. But the two disciplines are necessary to the furtherance of knowledge and they cannot get along without each other. Work therefore, which demonstrates the place and necessity of philosophy in synthesizing the various sciences is at this time of unusual significance. Such significance must, we feel, be accorded to Cassirer's volume.

The history of scientific concepts is brought down to date by the third section of the book which deals with the Einstein theory of relativity. Here the author relates the philosophical concepts of Einstein to the earlier work of Newton, Hume and Kant and shows the steps which have led to Einstein's conclusions. From the standpoint of the philosophical implications of relativity, this is the clearest and most comprehensive treatment of the subject that we can remember. He begins by showing that in the transition from the special to the general theory of relativity, Einstein appeals primarily to the epistemological motive.

"When, for example, Einstein gives as the essential result of his theory that by it 'The last remainder of physical objectivity' is taken from space and time (17, p. 13), this answer of the physicist contains for the epistemologist the precise formulation of his real problem."

That is to say what Einstein is striving after is some eventual standard of measurement, and this standard of measurement he discovers to be not something objectively given, but something which the mind determines as surely as the pint cup is an arbitrary determination and not a measurement built into the necessities of the universe. Thus even the atom can be shown not to possess arbitrariness but to depend for its scientific usefulness upon the interpretation which thinking men give it.

"The content of the idea of the atom changes and shifts from place to place in the course of the development of physics and chemistry, but the function of the atom as the temporarily ultimate unit of measurement remains. When we pass from the consideration of 'ponderable' matter to the consideration of the ether, when we seek a unity, which comprehends not only the mechanical but also the optical and electrical phenomena, the atom of matter becomes the atom of electricity, the electron."

And so he shows the atom to be "not an absolute minimum of being, but a relative minimum of measure:

"There must be established a certain standpoint for the comparison and correlation of magnitudes; certain constants must be established at least hypothetically and in preliminary fashion before a concrete measurement can take place. In this sense, each measurement contains a purely ideal element; it is not so much with the sensuous instruments of measurement that we measure natural processes as with our own thoughts." . . . "thought possesses a relatively fixed standpoint only by *taking* it.

The philosophical and scientific world has been put under a double debt, first to the translators William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey and second to the Open Court Publishing Co. for undertaking the publication of so considerable a volume.

It is a distinct pleasure with which one turns from the close reasoning and lucidly sustained arguments of Cassirer to the lively and more popular exposition by the brilliant Frenchman, Charles Nordmann, Astronomer to the Paris Observatory. Its charming introduction declares:

"Our age is like the noisy and unsubstantial froth that crowns, and hides for a moment, the gold of some generous wine. When all the transitory murmur that now fills our ears is over, Einstein's theory will rise before us as the great lighthouse on the brink of this sad and petty twentieth century of ours."

Thus he introduces the considerations which show the immense moment "to science, including psychology," of the theory of relativity. It calls for a complete revision of our ideas of time and space. He proceeds by interesting illustration and vivacious putting to make clear even for the layman such complicated matters as the contraction theory of Lorenz, the curvature of light, the relation of mass to velocity, the vanishing of the old mechanics, the new conception of gravitation and the finitude of the universe.

We have consistently held Einstein's own little book entitled *Relativity* to be the most easily understood by the technically trained, but this quality must now we believe be passed to Nordmann. The book is so well translated that one catches the characteristics of the French mind and language and even the most stolid of reviewers finds it difficult to put down the book or to miss a word of it. We are not surprised that ten thousand copies were sold in France in five days nor that *The London Daily Mail* pronounced it "by far the clearest account."

At only one point do we find the author blinded by too narrow an interest. In his anxiety to bestow rather extreme praise upon a fellow-countryman, he declares:

"It is really to Henri Poincaré, the great Frenchman whose death has left a void that will never be filled, that we must accord the

merit of having first proved, with the greatest lucidity and the most prudent audacity, that time and space, as we know them, can only be relative."

This seems a claim which needs qualification in the light of the history of philosophy.

Professor Thirring's book is a similar attempt on the part of the Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Vienna, to provide an explanation of Relativity which can be followed by the man of average intelligence and non-technical training. To this end, he has eliminated the use of mathematical formulas. The book forms a valuable addition to the popular exposition of Einstein.

We turn from these more serious reflections on Einstein to the new editions of Claude Bragdon's books *Four-Dimensional Vistas* and *A Primer of Higher Space*. As one takes up the first of these the question at once arises, Are the scientific discoveries of Einstein to be attended by a recrudescence of occultism similar to that which followed the work of Galileo?

Four-Dimensional Vistas seems to be an attempt to find in Einstein's ideas of relativity, non-Euclidean geometry, and curved space, justification and synthesis for every form of mental extravagance. From the mathematical fictions of minus quantities and transcendal functions to modern spiritualism with its crystal gazing, we wander through a world chiefly characterized by appearance of the unexpected and all are smilingly turned over to the care of the fourth dimension.

It is as if all the insoluble problems known to science, life and religion were to be cast into the fourth dimensional alembic and to emerge pure coin of fact and reason, duly and truly clear of the dross of mystery. Evolution and isomerism, cell subdivision and electricity, clairvoyance and re-incarnation, sleep, dreams, and death, all are manifestations of the fourth dimension.

From beginning to end the author feels no hesitancy in asserting and apparently does not sense the embarrassing hunger of the reader for at least a gleam of scientific proof. The book is delightfully free from the controversial spirit. The author means to agree with everybody and draw all contrasting opinions into a happy synthesis.

If one has been led to full credence by *Four-Dimensional Vistas*, he will surely crave the visual help offered by the plates and figures of *A Primer of Higher Space*. And this latter volume will prove interesting to others because it contains so much in the way of illustration of what has been ordinarily set forth in describing for the popular mind the problems and solutions connected with the assumptions of so-called higher space.

R.T.F.

The Clear Shining of a Great Soul

AN OLD CASTLE AND OTHER ESSAYS, by CALEB T. WINCHESTER, late Professor of English Literature in Wesleyan University. Macmillan, New York. Pp. xix-395.

No more fitting motto could have been found for this volume of Doctor Winchester than the words of Newman which appear before the Preface:

"Men live after their death,—they live not only in their writings or their chronicled history, but still more in that AGRAPHOS MNHMH exhibited in a school of pupils who trace their moral parentage to them."

Such was the undying influence of this teacher of men. One takes up the posthumous writing of such a teacher with a fear that work which has been gathered together after his death will fail to add to his fame and may prove derogatory; but such fears find no justification here. The initial essay, which provides the title of the book, is a rare bit of literature in itself, displaying a delicacy of mental taste and a fulness of historical knowledge which give the scenes of the past indescribable vividness and interest. One cannot well rise from the reading of *An Old Castle* without a new appreciation of those personalities whose experiences clothed it with glamour of romance.

There is a group of essays on the Shakespearian philosophical analysis and a brilliant insight into Shakespeare's portrayal of character. The essays on the Age of Queen Anne, on Swift, Burns, Ruskin, Browning, Clough and Bronson Alcott, while not all maintaining the same high level, are fresh and original. We especially like those on Swift and Burns. The book not only furnishes a fascinating example of Winchester's literary power but possesses significance to the understanding mind as the clear shining of a great soul.

"The Gentleman with a Duster," Again

SEVEN AGES, a brief and simple Narrative of the Pilgrimage of the Human Mind as it Has Affected the English-speaking World, by A GENTLEMAN WITH A DUSTER. Putnam's, New York. Pp. xi-218.

The Gentleman with a Duster has again distinguished himself, this time in a wider field of human history than he has previously essayed. As always, keen in his analysis of the salient points of power in the great spirits of history, he relates with impressive insight. The seven intellectual leaders named by him as moulding the thought of the English-speaking world are Socrates, Aristotle, Jesus, Augustine, Erasmus, Cromwell and Wesley. It is no disparagement of the other essays to say that the essay on Socrates presents the most vivid picture of the times and the motives which ruled the Socratic age that the writer

remembers having read. Following a description of the age he declares: "It was in an hour of human history as perilous as this that Socrates appeared among men with his message from God. He had, as his companion a spirit, or a voice, which constantly instructed him. One of his English critics has said hastily that this daemonium of Socrates is a case for the pathologist—without pausing to ask himself whether any pathologist in Europe could survive a cross-examination at the hands of Socrates. As well might he refer the genius of Shakespeare to a phrenologist or the broadcasting sympathy of Wesley's soul to a man like Dr. Freud—of one idea and that a nasty one. But thus in all ages of pause and poverty does well-intentioned mediocrity, mounting the step ladder of presumption, attempt to take with tape or foot rule the measure of Alp and Himalaya. To Socrates, who was the great enemy of all such quackery, his conversion was real, the restraining voice of his daemonium was real: and we must be blind indeed if we do not see that it was only because of this unmistakable spiritual experience that he became, what this very critic acknowledges he did become, the chief originator of "a vast revolution." The man was inspired. When he began to teach, the priest was in power but on the defensive: a situation of deadly menace both to freedom and to truth. Religion was supported by the superstitious peasant, afraid for his crops and his cattle more than for his own soul, and by such vested interests of the temple as were represented by the men who contracted to supply sacrificial animals for the altar . . . But the more thoughtful and disinterested citizens were listening with eagerness or curiosity to almost every conceivable theory of materialistic philosophy. . . . He said that the great object of life was to live in communion with the eternal ideas of truth, goodness and beauty; and of all the forms of truth that which seemed to him obviously the most important for mankind was the inward and spiritual truth of a man's personality. . . . There he stood in the falling twilight of Athenian glory, his feet planted with unshakable firmness on the rock of common sense, teaching individual men to lean the weight of their lives on the eternal realities of existence, and bidding them search within their souls for the divine truth which alone could set them free from delusion."

R. T. F.

CHINA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, by EDWARD THOMAS WILLIAMS, Professor of Oriental Languages and Literature in the University of California. T. Y. Crowell Co. Pp. xv-613.

Residence for years in the capital, Peking, the most revealing city in China, enables the author to speak with authority. His frank sympathy with the Chinese people and keen appreciation of their finest qualities render him a delightful raconteur of the Chinese of yesterday and a fascinating delineator of the Chinese of today.

The volume is encyclopedic. Every phase of the life of this remarkable people is touched upon. We read of the strange customs in family

life, where the centuries have seen few changes; of their crafts, guilds, festivals, religious and foreign relations. The political developments since the overthrow of the Manchus are clearly traced in a manner which reveals many fundamental Chinese characteristics. Although the volume covers so wide a range of study and presents a great mass of information it is written so lucidly and with so keen a sense of humor that one reads the book as if it were a "best seller" novel. An appendix, containing authoritative tables, and an exhaustive index give the reader immediate access to the facts set forth in this interesting study.

The author's conclusions are optimistic. After stating the ugly, discouraging facts concerning China today he says, "The Chinese people are still there. . . . They are industrious and aim to be law-abiding. The wealth of the country is not destroyed, however great the debts of the government may become. These patient, law-abiding citizens for the most part go about their business as usual. While there are disturbances here and there in the vast territory of China, yet in most places life is still peaceful. The traveler generally pursues his journey unmolested, and American missionaries, even women, unarmed and unescorted, go from village to village and carry on their work without interruption. It is this that makes one hopeful. Eventually the common sense of the common people will bring to an end the foolish factional strife that is going on, and national welfare will supplant personal ambitions."

LUTHER FREEMAN.

A DEFENSE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT, being an essay on The Foundations of Belief, by ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, F. R. S. New Edition. George H. Doran and Co., New York. Pp. x-355.

The volume is a reprint of the Essay on *Philosophic Doubt* published in 1879 and long out of print. The work is now republished as collateral to the author's Gifford Lectures, to which there is frequent reference.

The republication forms a useful service to the world of culture as rounding out and making accessible the complete work of Balfour. For this reason as well as for its intimate connection with the popular Gifford Lectures, the volume will be widely appreciated.

R. T. F.

MAN AND CULTURE, by CLARK WISSLER. New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

This is one of the modern type of treatises which employ a special nomenclature, fond of such terms as "complex." Culture, we are told, is a "complex." For instance, at page 271, the author remarks that the control and discipline of the individual, "is, after all, but a culture complex." He starts out with the proviso that he will not use the word "culture" of special education or polish; it is to be understood

in a democratic way, without any ideals of superiority, for the "Eskimo and [the] Hottentot have no less a culture of their own, than the French or the English." The book is thus dead to personality and the moving upward to a higher life, with imperishable treasures from the past. It is Man and Culture without the element that makes them unique in the universe. For the study of interesting oddities in past civilizations in a comparative way, the book is a useful compendium; see for example the map at page 151.

JAMES MAIN DIXON.

INTELLIGENCE TESTING, Methods and Results, by RUDOLPH PINTNER, Ph. D., Professor of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1923. Pp. viii-406.

Since the inception a few years ago by psychologists of the work of testing the intelligence, there has been a steady stream of publications of results in journals, magazines, proceedings and bound volumes. Since the elaborate task undertaken during the late war of carrying out a program for making intelligence examinations of the entire United States Army, the publications have been far too numerous for any but the specialist in psychometry to keep up with. Amongst all these, however, there has been no one work which has brought together the most important of the results or given a simple account of intelligence testing, which could serve as a satisfactory guide to the laymen or one whose interest in the subject is not professional.

Professor Pintner presents in a succinct way three different aspects of mental tests: (1) the historical development of tests, (2) a description of the various tests now available for use, and (3) a summarization of the results of mental testing. Under the third aspect of the subject are separate chapters dealing with the testing of special groups: the feeble-minded, the superior, the soldier, the school child, the college student, the delinquent, the dependent, the deaf, the blind, the negro, the foreign-born and the employe.

The work is confined to the subject of intelligence tests as distinguished from educational tests and measurements. On the latter subject there are already available treatments of the subject adequate to the present stage of its development.

The book is by one whose authority in the field of mental tests is substantiated by his authorship of other works as well as by his training, his experience and his position. A member of the American Psychological Association, he has degrees from Edinburgh and from Leipzig, where he was a student of Wilhelm Wundt. He is the author of *A Scale of Performance Tests* (with Patterson), *The Mental Survey*, and translator from the German of Wundt's *Introduction to Psychology*, and Schulze's *Experimental Psychology and Pedagogy*. He had valu-

able experience during the war as one of the Psychological Examiners of the Army, doing yeoman service at Camp Lee during 1917-17, his English birth and citizenship preventing his acceptance of a commission in the U. S. Army. He has written also in the field of Education and is now one of the editorial board of the *Journal of Educational Research*.

KARL T. WAUGH.

THE REDS BRING REACTION, by W. J. GHENT. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Pp. xvii-113.

Controversy is an art whose artists are few. In what field of opinion discussion of differences is most difficult, it would be hard to say, but it is sufficiently arduous in the realm of political theory to warrant us in giving high praise to any earnest and practical thinker who exercises a just and discriminating graciousness with vigor. W. J. Ghent has achieved this distinction in this book. He has combined attentive detachment and intimate knowledge, earnest devotion and critical appraisal, comprehensive grasp and analysis of details. The record of revolutionists' mistakes and the indictment of the "social Jesuit" convince the reader of the author's conclusion that the determining forces in social progress are spiritual and that it will be by ethical skill that the true political theory, whatever it may be, will prevail.

CLAUDE G. BEARDSLEE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO REFLECTIVE THINKING, by COLUMBIA ASSOCIATES IN PHILOSOPHY. New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1923. Pp. vii-351.

To demonstrate the methods of critical reflection in the great fields of science and philosophy, these nine members of the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University have carefully formulated a body of classified material which reveals the nature of practical, logical thinking in experimental science, mathematics, law and social relations. They take up diagnosis, the uses of hypotheses, the search for causal relations, deduction and explanation, showing how all of these are employed in searching out the past or studying into the future. Each chapter is concluded with a set of questions and exercises and with a bibliography. The questions are good and the bibliographies are excellent.

This is a scholarly piece of work and is a clear and convincing presentation of the nature and appeal of disciplined thought.

C. G. B.

THE WORKSHOP OF THE MIND, by HALLAM HAWKSWORTH. Illustrated. The Century Company, New York and London, 1923. 252 pp.

The avowed purpose of this little book is to put within the mental grasp of children a knowledge of how they think and why they act

as they do. The method is figures of speech that are apt to mislead and analogies that are largely false. The illustrations are attractive and some of the captions are attention-arresting. But when the child is told that, "we build our brains ourselves," he is started out on the way to misunderstandings which all his later training can scarcely rectify. The problems of how we think and act as we do are usually reserved for the second year of college life and can hardly be presented to children. A book of this sort would seem to operate as a good fore-runner for the predatory pseudo-psychologists.

J. W. TODD.

WHAT IS TRUTH?. An essay in the theory of knowledge, by ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1923.

This is a continuation of the epistemological analysis which was presented by several writers, of whom the author of this book was one, in *Essays In Critical Realism*. The author's present position is that truth is what we cannot help believing after critical reflection has transcended the data of sense and soul. This means that belief is more fundamental than truth and that logic is subordinated to considerations of what is physically or morally practical. We must accept the relativity inherent in personal interpretation and must find the data for appraisals of certainty in the beliefs of other people, estimates of consistency, the check and balance of this world's relationships and a meta-physical doctrine of the self. This is approximately Personalistic and it is carefully written out, but we hope it shall not appear philosophically provincial if we say that this position was earlier taken by Bowne and expressed with a clarity and completeness which are lacking here.

CLAUDE G. BEARDSLEE.

NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE, by HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. Chicago, Open Court, 1923. Pp. 529.

This is a series of essays by a Christian philosopher who is convinced that part of survival fitness in a man or in a nation consists in belief in God and immortality. He realizes that there is no absolute proof available but believes that "all natural science and natural law, the order and meaning which man finds in Nature, all that makes a Cosmos rather than a Chaos of the universe, is maniacal illusion unless Nature keeps faith with the intelligence which she has generated." This conviction, with which we agree, is grounded, in another essay, in a rambling theory of the self which we should say is inadequate. Self-consciousness is defined as "not an awareness of the self, but a kind of relation subsisting between the self and its objects," and human nature is treated as a mental category which means that "man's self as a real factor in the world is potentially greater than its current history." On the other hand, the essence of personality is described in terms of in-

telligence, foresight, design and will. What these would be without self-awareness it is hard to understand, and surely capacity for growth is only one of the elements in a complete description of the soul. In view of the soundness of the author's background this essay is particularly disappointing. It is very long, it is a loose weave, the middle is but another beginning and the belated conclusion is not the end.

The author's dislike of fixed beliefs is well grounded, even though he does not solve the problem of identity in change, but his conclusion in the last essay that he cannot join a church and retain intellectual independence is made possible only by ignoring facts. Most communions do require allegiance to a creed and fixity within it—including some whose leaders, expressing their personal attitude, credit to their denomination a breadth or absence of creed which flatly misrepresents the official denominational position—but his reasons for not joining are unconvincing and if he really wants to unite with the church he has only to inform himself that there are groups who would accept his personal nobility and his beliefs, as stated in this book, as adequate credentials for membership.

The book is weakened by absurdities in phrase-making. "Twained worlds," "surface moil," "psychical haps" and "hurrysomes bubbles" represent English on the rack. In spite of these blemishes, however, the book is rich in the mature reflection of an honest thinker.

C. G. B.

THE THEORY OF ETHICS, ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. New York, Macmillan, 1922. Pp. 197.

Adopting the author's assertion that "goodness is a quality which makes its appearance only in a secondary or reflective situation and . . . is dependent on a judgment of approval," we should call this book good thinking. The author is so well-informed and so fair-minded that his acute appreciation of the merits of conflicting viewpoints sometimes weakens the drive of his mind toward a conclusion, but this is hardly a fault when we consider how thoroughly fair he has been to his subject. His position is more seriously obscured by an apparent fear to resort frankly to a metaphysical, unscientific, Christian foundation for his explanations of moral value. Fundamentally Christ's subject was God's ethics and if he was wrong about it all and if in the absence of a God we have to depend upon naturalism, Christ's contribution to moral philosophy may be ignored. But if Christ was right and we are spiritually made in God's image then the best theory of ethics is to be found in Christ's sayings and example, and everything off that foundation is inadequate to explain the facts. This book is an excellent technical discussion, in terms of moral philosophy's historical intricacies, of a subject which must be settled ultimately, we believe, in terms of Christ's simple spiritual truths.

C.G.B.

REICHL'S PHILOSOPHISCHER ALMANACH AUF DAS
JAHR 1923, herausgegeben von PAUL FELDKELLER. Darmstadt,
Otto Reichl, 1923.

This "periodical hand and reference book of philosophical life in the whole world" is in six parts. The first is historical and biographical and contains such items as reminiscences of Hegel, notes on the thirty-seven German philosophical associations, discussion of the present philosophical academies and references to the current philosophical prize essay topics. The second part consists of miscellaneous material garnished with philosophical aphorisms, epigrams and sayings. The third part contains five short articles, and the balance of the manual is devoted to editorial comment, index and advertisements.

The item of greatest interest to Personalists and their friends is the notice of the second of the Kant Association's two prize essay subjects. This is "Personalism and idealism as fundamental types of world-philosophy, illustrated and reviewed with respect to the present experiments in a Personalistic philosophy." The contest closes April 1, 1925, and the prizes are "M. 9000 und 6000 (gerechnet zu einem Dollarstand von M. 250)."

The almanach is interesting and should prove to be a valuable philosophical record.

C. G. B.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- BACKBONE, by SAMUEL S. DRURY. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. Pp. vii and 216.
- FREEDOM OF THE MIND IN HISTORY, by HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. Pp. ix and 297.
- DANTE AND HIS INFLUENCE, by THOMAS NELSON PAGE. Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1923. Pp. viii and 239.
- THE HEALING POWER, by HELEN MARY BOULNOIS. Published by E. P. Dutton & Company, New York, 1924. Pp. xi and 85.
- CHILD LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION, by RAYMOND G. FULLER. Published by Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1923. Pp. xiii and 323.
- PRIMITIVE MENTALITY, by LUCIEN LEVY-BRUHL. Translated by Lilian A. Clare. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. Pp. 458.
- DIALOGUES ON METAPHYSICS AND ON RELIGION, by NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE. Translated by Morris Ginsberg. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. Pp. 374.
- THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF MORAL OBLIGATION, by J. E. TURNER. Published by the Macmillan Company, Ltd., London, 1924. Pp. xii and 280.
- CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS, by ALBERT SCHWEITZER. Translated by John Naish. Published by A. & C. Black, Ltd., London, 1923. Pp. vii and 298.
- SCEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH, by GEORGE SANTAYANA. Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1923. Pp. xii and 314.
- CONSERVATISM, RADICALISM AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD, by A. B. WOLFE. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. Pp. xi and 355.
- THE UNKNOWABLE, by GEORGE SANTAYANA. Published by Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1923. Pp. 29.
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY, by G. A. JOHNSTON. Published by Macmillan, New York, 1923. Pp. vii and 400.
- CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY, edited by J. H. MUIRHEAD. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1924. Pp. 432.

Our Contributors' Page

Dr. Mario Puglisi is doing an outstanding piece of work in Italy as a leader of liberal thought. He is Editor of *Il Progresso Religioso* published at Florence. His keenness to the religious and philosophical movements of his times makes his contribution on the *Present State of Philosophy in Italy* of special importance. It will be of interest to our readers that Dr. Puglisi is to undertake a regular department on European Thought in our *Current Thought* section.



If John Richard Moreland will continue to send us poetry of the high order of the two sonnets which appear in this number, we shall have to continue to give them space in spite of the crowded condition of the editorial portfolio. But sample them for yourself.



Dr. Georgia E. Harkness is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Education at Elmira College. She is also the author of *The Church and the Immigrant* published recently by Doran, a book that is being used extensively as a home-missions text-book in Americanization. She shows herself adept in the mastery of ideas in the article on *The Religious Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green*.



Professor Lawrence C. Lockley is Professor of English in the University of California, Southern Branch. He presents a novel and highly original study of the character of Iago from the standpoint of modern psychology.



Virginia Taylor McCormick, for whose articles our readers are ever eager, has recently undertaken the editorship of *The Lyric*. In addition to her editorial duties she finds time for writing and lecturing. Her philosophically sound criticism of George Meredith discloses a keen power of literary analysis.

CONTENTS

<i>Articles:</i>	<i>Page</i>
I. The Occultism of Numbers THE EDITOR	157
II. The Present State of Philosophy in Italy . . . MARIO PUGLISI	162
III. Two Sonnets JOHN RICHARD MORELAND	171
IV. T. H. Green as a Philosopher of Religion . . . GEORGIA E. HARKNESS	172
V. A New Iago LAWRENCE C. LOCKLEY	179
VI. The Alien: verse A. PEARLE CARTER	183
VII. Meredith's Philosophy of Joy VIRGINIA TAYLOR MCCORMICK	184
<i>Current Thought</i>	199
Plato's Republic, a Tract for the Times.	
Making Einstein's Relativity More Relative.	
The Anniversary of Immanuel Kant.	
<i>Notes and Discussions</i>	202
The Lonesome Bell.	
The Present Need.	
Personalistic Sympathies at German Universities.	
Defective Psychology in Our Text-Books.	
<i>Along the Bookshelf</i>	206
<i>The Scientific Lion and the Philosophic Lamb.</i>	
The Domain of Natural Science: <i>Hobson.</i>	
The Theory of Monads: <i>Carr.</i>	
<i>The Question of Freedom.</i>	
Freedom and Christian Conduct: <i>Haas.</i>	
Authority and Freedom: <i>Rawlinson</i>	
Freedom and Liberty: <i>Benett.</i>	
Freedom of the Mind in History: <i>Taylor.</i>	
<i>Philosophy and Religion.</i>	
The Reason in Faith: <i>Flewelling.</i>	
Modernism in Religion: <i>Sterrett.</i>	
Miracles and the New Psychology: <i>Micklem.</i>	
The Christian Faith and Eternal Life: <i>Horr.</i>	
The Philosophy of Prayer: <i>Mahoney.</i>	
Harmonism and Conscious Evolution: <i>Walston.</i>	
Sent Forth: <i>Tilroe.</i>	
Outspoken Essays, Second Series: <i>Inge.</i>	
A Study of Kant: <i>Ward.</i>	
<i>Miscellaneous.</i>	
The Trend in American Education: <i>Russell.</i>	
The Medicine Man: <i>Maddox.</i>	
Essays of a Biologist: <i>Huxley.</i>	
Anger: <i>Stratton.</i>	
A History of Ancient Greek Literature: <i>Fowler.</i>	
The History of Utopian Thought: <i>Hertzler.</i>	
Dante and His Influence: <i>Page.</i>	
<i>Books Received</i>	227

We will pay seventy-five cents a copy for Numbers 1 and 2 of Volume I, and Number 1 of Volume II of *The Personalist* if in good condition.

To the Gentle Personalist

¶ Three letters recently reached the Editor's desk from men widely separated by space and by occupation. The first one is a New York newspaper editor, essayist and critic.

¶ "Brentano's supplies me with *The Personalist*, which seems to me to uphold California's reputation for originality. A statistician recently wrote me, asking that I name two or three of the magazines that interested me most; and *The Personalist* was included in my list."

¶ The next letter was from a minister in New Jersey who writes:

¶ "I have recently received the July number of *The Personalist*, which is the only number of the Journal that I have seen. Such articles as "Creative Personality" every person seriously at work should read. It helps one to understand himself and to appreciate his relation to his work. I thank you for that article and enclose my check to pay for a yearly subscription."

¶ The third one spoke volumes in a word and that word was emphasized by a check:

¶ "Indeed there is no Journal I look for as much."

¶ All of which makes us feel we are on the right track. Now if some of those who see real points of criticism would only have the courage of their convictions, their ideas would be of immense value to the Editor.

¶ Do not forget our standing offer of renewal. One dollar added to your own subscription of two dollars will pay for one year for a new subscriber and yourself.